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The word "deficit" has dominated the most recent 35 years of Boston's fiscal 
history. This report probes the experience and lessons of this history in order to 
propose a more permanent resolution of Boston's financial difficulties. 
Three deficit categories are identified and analyzed: appropriation deficits, 
revenue deficits and overlay deficits. Over the past 35 years, the City has had 12 
years of appropriation deficits, 19 years of revenue deficits and 28 years of overlay 
deficits. In each year the City's budget was certified as in balance. Deficits became a 
way of life. Fortunately the overlay deficit problem, except for the potentially 
expensive utility cases, has been overcome through revaluation. The appropriation and 
revenue deficits remain tobe eliminated. 
The report distinguishes between structural imbalances and operating deficits. 
Structural imbalances are attributable to impositions on Boston of service 
responsibili ties that are unique or of disproportional scale among ci ties of Boston's 
population dass. . They include costs that are mandated by the historical patterns of 
service and cost allocation as between the Commonwealth and its cities and towns, 
and costs that may be explained by the special role that Boston fulfills as the state's 
capital city, as the economic and cultural center of the New England region and as a 
major entry point and way station for successive waves of foreign immigration. 
Conversely some of the City's financial difficulties represent operating gaps that 
occur because spending exceeds available resources. They indicate political and/or 
managerial inability or unwillingness to operate within the limits of 
expenditure/revenue plans. They also reflect the failures or absence of adequate 
.fiscal planning and management systems and controls. 
i 
In the last 35 years the structural gap has gradually but definitively been closing 
as more and more service and/or cost responsibilities have been shifted to state 
government. Prime examples include public welfare and county court takeovers and 
state/munidpal sharing of MBTA defidts. 
The persistence of annual operating defidts over a long period of time, however, 
Ieads to the inevitable conclusion that public and bureaucratic tolerance of such fiscal 
behavior is rooted in Boston's local political culture. 
The report recommends that remaining structural imbalances and operating 
deficit issues be addressed. lt recommends a number of specific options to reduce the 
structural gap and a number of fiscal management reforms to eliminate recurring 
operating deficits. These outside Boston's political and cultural context, particularly 
taxpayers in other d ties and towns who helped baUout recurring operating defid ts in 
the past, deserve maximum effort by the City to live within its appropriation and 
revenues. 
To reduce the structural gap some of the report's recommendations are: 
1. Commonwealth assumption of responsibility for correctional services 
paid for by Boston and all dties and towns. Other human service 
responsibilities to be shifted to the Commonwealth include the 
municipal cost of personal health care, local public health activities, 
and environmental health services financed from the property tax and 




A change in the funding mechanism for the municipal share of the 
MBTA defidt, or adoption of a new formula for allocating munidpal 
proportians of the MBTA defidt that is more accurate in measuring 
city and town residence of transit system riders. 
An increase in the proportion of the state's tax growth dedicated to 
the Local Aid Fund from 4-0% to 50%. 
-
A revision in the distribution formula for lottery aid to dties and 




































Institute a fairer system of state reimbursement for property taxes 
lost on state-owned land for institutions, update in Heu tax payments 
on state-owned and authority-owned buildings, extend state 
reimbursement to all tax-exempt land and buildings owned by the 
Commonwealth and provide state reimbursement for property tax 
exemptions to non-profit non-governmental institutions. 
Authorize cities and towns to levy selective local option taxes that 
would not impact adversely on local economies, particularly excise 
taxes on economic activities with clearly identifiable beneficiaries of 
such taxed services. 
To reduce Boston's yearly operating deficit the report recommends strengthening 
the fiscal management structure. 
1. Establish a new posi tion of chief financial officer or amend provisions 
of ordinances affecting the position of Director of Administrative 
Services to provide its incumbent with the powers and duties of a 
chief financial officer. 
2. Make the Audit Committee appointed by and accountable to the City 
Council for audit report implementation and follow up. 
3. . Establish a Revenue Advisory Board to provide advice and counsel on 
the estimation of City revenues and receipts. 
To tighten Boston's fiscal controls some of the report's recommendations are: 
1. Amend the quarterly budget allotment · system for personnet to 
require a mayoral waiver that specifies what reductions will be made 
in the subsequent quarter to keep within allotments and/or what 
reallocations will be made to maintain spending within appropriate 
limi ts for the balance of the f iscal year. 
2. 
3. 
To cover unforeseen and extraordinary expenditures, the City should 
appropriate an annual reserve equivalent to a maximum of 396 of the 
property tax levy and transfers from this reserve should be made only · 
by the City Council upon recommendation of the Mayor. 
We support the Boston Municipal Research Bureau's proposal that 
such a reserve fund should include a Violation penalty. If the City's 
operating deficit exceeds the reserve amount, the reserve should be 
increased by 5096 in the next fiscal year. If the defici t is less than 
the reserve, the balance would be available for next year's 
appropriation or to reduce the tax rate. 
Make Boston abide by the same laws affecting other cities and towns 
which do not allow the net proceeds from the sale of surplus property 
to be used for operating budget purposes. 
iii 
. ' 
4. Eliminate by Horne Rule petition the School Committee's remaining 
fiscal authority, thereby guaranteeing a full review of the School 
Department's budget and putting the Boston School Committee on the 
same focting as all School Committees in Massachusetts. 
5. Require the City Corporation Counsel to certify the forthcoming 
year's expected court claims and judgments. City of Boston officials 
tend to underestimate funding requirements. A similar 







































Boston's financial problems have been a perennial issue. Moreover, at almest 
predictable intervals, the City's financial strains have degenerated into crises of 
varying proportions, Crises requiring emergency relief measures by the State 
Legislature and drastic, often reluctantly-imposed self-help efforts by City Hall. 
The purpese of this paper is to re-examine Boston's fiscallandscape over the past 
.thirty-five years, placing particular emphasis on repetitive patterns of fiscal stress. 
This historical review indicates major changes in the state-municipal services and cost 
mix, with special reference to their impacts on Boston's current and future finances. 
The vignettes describing fiscal conditions and trends during the administrations of the 
past three Mayors and the first two years of the present City Administration point up 
fiscal policies that were often politically expedient and short-sighted in perspective. 
They cilso reveal the extent to, which perledie Jegislati ve bailouts and austeri ty 
programs launched by Boston mayors resulted in Jastlng improvements or proved to be 
temporary palliatives. 
This analysis carefully distinguishes between structural gaps and operating gaps 
in Boston's fiscal equations. Same of the City's financial difficulties can be attributed 
to structural impositions created by law and/or tradition. They include costs of 
service responsibilities that are unique or of disproportional scale among eitles of 
Boston's population class, costs that are mandated by historical patterns of service and 
cost allocations in ;v1assachusetts as between the Commonwealth and its eitles and 
towns, and costs that may be explained by the special role that Boston fulfills as the 
state's capital city, as the economic and cultural center of the New England region and 
as a major entry point and way statlon for successi ve waves of foreign immigration. 
1 
Conversely some of the City's financial difficulties represent operating gaps that 
occur because spending exceeds available resources. They indicate political and/or 
managerial inability or unwillingness to operate within the Iimits of 
expenditure/revenue plans. They also reflect the failures or absence of adequate 
fiscal planning and management systems and controls. 
The constructi ve goals of this overall inquiry are: 
1. to point up existing imbalances in the mix of state-local services and 
costs and in the mix of state-local revenues that adversely affect 
Boston's finances and to propose remedies for such structural 
., 
inequities; and 
2. to identify persistent and lingering weaknesses in fiscal policies and 
practices, and to recommend strengthened resource and management 
mechanisms that will generate sound fiscal choices, minimize the 
incidence of budget expenditure overruns and revenue/receipt 
shortfalls, and reduce the erosion of the City's vibrant property tax 
base by indefensible assessment practices. 
The dreams of a New Boston and A World-Class City were dampened by failures 
to learn lessons from the City's financial history. The message of this report is that 
the current and future visions of a City of Neighborhoods and of Boston In the Year 
2000 will likewise be marred if fiscal policies and decisions are not discipllned by the 
powerful events and learning experiences of the past. 




































1. Factual summades of fiscal conditions covering each mayoralty 
administration since 1950 is presented in the first part covering the 
administrations of Hynes, Collins, White and Flynn. 
2. A synthesis of the consequences and legacies of fiscal policies and 
practices over the past thirty-five years drawn from the 
chronological detailed analysis. 
3. A final chapter of recommendations in the form of a State-Boston 
agenda of action to correct existing structural imbalances in state-
local services and costs, to remedy inequi ties in the current mix of 
state-local revenues, to strengthen Boston•s institutional capacity to 
plan and manage its finances and to plug remaining loopholes in the 
City's own fiscal systems and practices. 
ß. A DECADE OF DENIAL AND DISAPPOINTMENT: 
THE HYNES ADMINISTRATION, 19.50-19.59 
Hynes• Fiscal Legacy 
The 1950 inaugural message of newly-elected Mayor Hynes devoted considerable 
attention to the fragile state of the City's finances and to the counter-productive and 
short-sighted fiscal policies of the prior administration. It ci ted in particular the 
escalation of tax-supported debt, borrowing for current expenses (welfare and transit 
defici ts) and an overassessment-abatement cycle that produced artificially-low tax . 
rates and undermined confidence in tax assessment practices. It emphasized that 
these were policies that placed the City's future in considerable jeopardy. 
3 
This publicly-announced candor concerning City finances, includ~ng an express 
commitment to implement re<;:ommendations of the comprehensive survey of the City's 
operations and administrative practices,-. helped win support fr,om the .1950 Legislature 
for funding tax refunds · granted by _tl")e. Gity . over the next fi ve years . on prior 
assessments 'that were in ·excess of available> overlay reserves. By author,izing Boston 
to allocate $2 million a year to an overlay deficit funding account until ac;:cumulated 
overlay deficits (estimated at $11- million) were finally liquidated, the Legislature was 
giving the new-Administration a badly-needed breathing period to overcome financial 
difficulties as indicated in the following results of the 1949 fiscal year: 
1. A net operating deficit, actual expenaitures in excess of actual 
revenues and receipts, of $3.7 millon; 
2. An accumulated net operating deficit of $8.1 million, equivalent to 6 
percent of annual revenues; 
3. A revenue shortfall of $4.3 million over tax levy estimates; 
4. Ahated taxes of $13.8 million, equivalent to 17 percent of net 
property tax collections; 
5. Temporary loans issued in anticipation of revenue not paid from 
current taxes af.ld carried over into the next fiscal year in the amount 
of $1 0 million; 
6. Issues of. new b.onded debt totalling $27.1 million in 1949 that were 
three, tim~s the total . of debt .rnaturing. during that year, including 




































Familiar Signals of Fiscal Strain 
While Hynes began his administration preaching fiscal good management, a flurry 
of distress signals re-emerged between 1950 and 1957. Except for the new 
Administration's determined policy to lower the City's indebtedness- it did succeed in 
reducing bonded debt from a net total of $7 5 million in 1949 to $59 million in 19 56 -
the new fiscal difficulties-closely resembled those of past administrations, as shown in 
the summary of key financial indicators for the 1950-1957 period (Table I). Moreover, 
abatements on 1949 and prior tax years had reached $20 million by 1957 compared 
with the original estimate of $11 million in 1950. 
The indicators in TableI clearly revealed that Boston's current operating account 
was in serious disarray during the 1950-1957 period. Seven successive years of 
operating deficits had brought on an accumulation of red ink in excess of $35 million, 
representing over 20 percent of the City's annual revenue yield. Operating deficits 
were attributable to the proclivity of City offleials to spend beyend collections of 
receipts, mainly by carelessly or deliberately overestimating estimates of revenues 
and receipts in annual tax rate calculations. Net revenues from current and prior 
1evies of property taxes fell consistently below tax levy estimates because of refunds 
required by abatements, as did net collections of motor vehicle excise taxes and poll 
taxes. Ironically, overestimates of Boston's share of state aid by the State 
Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, ostensibly legally responsible for the 
oversight of local fiscal practices, exacerbated this tendency of the City to 
overestirnate revenues from its own sources. Between 1951 and 1954, for example, 
overestimates of State income, corporation and meals taxes due to Boston totalled 
$9.7 million or one-third of the overall revenue shortfall experienced during this 
period. 
5 
To offset chronic shortages of cash during the 1950-57 period, City officials 
resorted to a number of dubious policies, e.g., issuing temporary loans late in the fiscal 
year for repayment not from taxes collected before the end of the fiscal year but from 
succeeding years' revenues. By the end of 1956, the pyramid of floating debt had 
reached $28 million. The City also borrowed $3.5 million in 1955 against tax titles 
from the Commonwealth for school and hospital maintenance, a bailout device not 
used since the Gr:eat Depression. 
Assessment/ Abatement Cycle 
Moreover, a long history of malpractice in establishing property tax assessments 
fed the City's temptations to spend beyond its means. lnflated assessments, imposed 
particularly on non-residential property, produced what proved to be temporary gains 
in property tax revenues. Large proportions of annual property tax levies had to be 
eventually abated and refunded with interest in amounts exceeding the minimum 
reserves (3 percent of property tax levy) required by law. To make rnatters worse, 
abated values were not used as the factual basis for correcting assessments in the 
subsequent years' assessment rolls. Thus a self-defeating assessment-abatement cycle 
resulted. , The failure of responsible City officials to equalize assessed values within 
and among classes of property as required by law, to restore predictability and 
certainty to ·taxable valuations of property and to stem the rising tide of tax rates, 
which climbed by 60 percent during the fifties, undermined confidence in Boston's real 
estate markets, contributed significantly to the depressed state of property values and 
deterred new construction and property rehabilitation. 
In 1954, for ·example, tax reftmds were equivalent to 6.6 percent of that year's 

















- - - - - - - - '- - - - - - - - -
TABLE I 
KEY FINANCIAL INDICATORS, CITY OF BOSTON 
1950 - 1957 
(millions) 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 -
Net operating surplus or 
(deficit) , end of year $(4.6) $(0.9) $(5.9) $(1.6) $(3.5) $(3.6) $(6.5) $(1.2) 
Accumulated surplus ( 12. 7) (13.7) (19.6) (21.2) (24.7) (28. 4) (34.9) (36.1) 
or (deficit) , end 
of year 
Revenue surplus or 
(deficit) , end of year (5.5) (4. 3) ( 8. 8) (6.8) (9.9) ( 3. 9) (18.0) ** ( 13. 6) 
Abatements* 4.4 4.6 7.0 9.4 8.9 8.2 9.8 
Prior year overlay 
(deficits) raised --- --- --- ( 2. 7) ( 4. 4) (5.8) (5.6) 
Overlay deficit 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 5.7 
funding account 
Funding loan *** --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Outstaoding temporary 
loans, end of year 10.0 10.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 20.0 28.0 
* Prior to adjustments. 
** Included anticipated proceeds from unexecuted sale of Sumner Traffic Tunnel 
fpr$7.9 million to Massachusetts Port Authority. 
*** Authorized by c. 717, Acts of 1957. 

























Between 19 50 and 19 56 assessed valuations attiibutable to new construction failed to 
reach a yearly average of $15 million. Taxbase growth was less than one percent per 
year. 
Disappointing Management Reforms 
Not only was the City spending beyond its means during the fifties, but there was 
li ttle evidence that responsible offleials were introducing the large-scale 
reorganizations and proposals for more effective utilization of personneland resources 
contained in the independent surveys of City operations carried out under direction of 
the Boston Finance Commission. The total number of City and County employees, for 
example, showed little change over the 1950-57 period -- 17,354 as of January 1, 
1950 versus 16,987 as of February 1, 1957, a net reduction of about 2 percent. The 
City did request and receive authorization from the Legislature for harne rule power 
to undertake departmental reorganization by local ordinance and initiated the 
establishment of a new Administrative Services Department under a Director with 
centralized responsibili ty for budget and personnel decisions. This move was designed 
to provide the Mayor with badly-needed staff support and fiscal control mechanisms. 
But the self-help efforts initiated in mid-1957, mainly to reduce acknowledged over-
staffing, failed to achieve established targets by wide margins for the reduction of 
permanent personnet and in appropriation allowances for temporary personnel and 
overtime, reflecting political difficulties in adjusting service levels to conform with 
population declines, a weakening local economy, changing service needs, depressed 
property values and the impact of technology on municipal operations. 
For example, with just over 3,000 employees in Boston's Police Department in 
1958, the ratio of employees to population was 3.76 per 1,000 as compared with an 
7 
average ratio for the 18 largest cities of 2.58. Boston's Fire Departrnent of almest 
2,200 ernployees showed a similarly high level of staff to population with a ratio of 
2.72 per 1,000 as contrasted with the ratio of 1.60 for the 18 largest cities of the 
nation. Boston's City Hospital, with 1,074 in-patient beds in 1958 and over 3,100 
employees, had an average staffing ratio of 2.95 per patient as compared with the 1.60 
average ratio covering 25 general hospitals containing over 400 beds. 
Funding Loan Act of 1957 
When fiscal distress signals erupted into a full-blown crisis in mid-1957, another 
round of state intervention to ease ßoston's finances became necessary. In addition to 
authorizing the City to fund (spread out) its accumulated deficits over a period of 
years (as in funding loan acts of 1938, 1941, 1946 and 1950), however, the Legislature 
included several "safeguards" in the funding loan legislation of 19 57 that were designed 
to discourage fiscal mismanagement and to stabilize the City's finances. The funding 
loan legislation authorized the issuance of up to $45 million in bonds for terms up to 20 
years and for the following purposes: 
1. To cover the City's net operating deficit as of the close of the 1956 
fiscal year; and 
2. To cover abatements of taxes levied in 1956 and prior years in excess 
of overlay reserves for those years that would be granted between 
January 1, 1956 and December 31, 1959. 
As subsequently applied, about $29 million from the funding bond proceeds were 
allocated to cover tax refunds of 1956 and prior years, while the remaining $16 million 



































As for the safeguards, what was omitted from the legislation was probably as 
i!Tlpgrtant to the City's long-range financial future as what was included. Although the 
gverlay requirement -- the tax levy set-aside for abatements -- was increased from 3 
g~rcent of the tax levy to a mimimutn of 5 percent and a maximum of 6 percent, 
ther~by presc;:ribing a more realistic reserve that would minimize large overlay 
<;leficits, ~he legislation was cornpletely silent on assessment and abatement practices 
~11d st_andards, apparently leaving the need for revaluation to the City's own 
getermination anc;i timetable. 
Other safeguards were directed toward preventing the pyramiding of defici ts and 
the car-eless esti_mation of municipal revenues, as summarized below: 
1. The amount of short-term loans issued in anticipation of revenue that 
could be outstanding at the end of the fiscal years was limited to the 
total of outstanding real estate and personal property taxes for the 
current and preceding years, thereby putting a realistic ceiling on 
temporary loans issued for carry-over into the succeeding fiscal year. 
2._ The amount by which estimated receipts exceeded actual receipts, 
e.g., revenue deficits, in the preceding year must be appro.priated in 
the suceeding year' s tax levy. 
3._ Estimated receipts used in determining the tax levy, except those 
estimated by state officials, could not exceed the aggregate amount 
of actual receipts~ from the same sources during the preceding year 
and must be annually certified to the State-by the City Auditor •. 
4. l?roceeds from tax ti tle loans could be used only for repayment of 
short-term loans issued in anticipation of revenue, thereby 
eliminating their use as receipts for tax rate reduction purposes. 
9 
The depth of Boston's financial difficulties during the fifties may be measured by 
the relative degree of relief that the City received from issuing $45 million in funding 
bonds in 19 57 and 19 58. The total bond issue was equi valent to 70 percent of the 
City's outstanding net debt and to more than 25 percent of its annual revenues. 
Unconvinced that the 1957 funding legislation had reversed Boston's fiscal trends 
. and stabilized its financial condition, Moody's Investors down-graded the City's credit 
standing late in 1959 to a speculative Baa rating and gave as its reasons Boston's high 
expense Ievels, near-steady tax base declines, little progress in counteracting urban 
deterioration, and a declining local economy due to shifts of population and shifts of 
industrial activity ciway ft-om the centrat city and away from New England. 
m. FISCAL FAMINE AND FEAST: THE COLLINS YEARS, 1960-1967 
The fiscal policies enunciated and carried out during the first term of the Collins 
Administration (1960-63) were in sharp centrast to those of the preceding decade. 
However, the secend term was somewhat Schizophrenie in character, its fiscal 
decisions perhaps dominated by the poli tical press ur es of organizing an election 
campaign for nomination to a U.S. Senate seat. 
New Fiscal Policies 
Sensitive to the historic pattern of periodic state bailouts to give Boston 
temporary financial relief, the Collins Administration immediately launched an 
extensive program of self-help efforts and sought selective assis:t:ance from the 
·~. 
~· 




































Imposed strict controls over spending with particular emphasis on 
achieving greater productivity through staff attrition, and using 
available leverage over school appropriation limi ts and capi tal 
outlays to hold school spending to realistic levels. 
Implemented large-scale departmental reorganizations and 
management improvements to improve cost-effectiveness of City 
operations. 
Pursued legally-available opportunities to enhance revenue yields 
from local sources. 
Continued debt policies that restricted the issuance of new long-term 
bonds to annual totals that were below retired amounts of old debt, 
and coordinated capital improvement needs with urban renewal plans 
to take full advantage of using capital outlays as local matehing 
requirements for federal urban renewal grants. 
Shepherded local initiatives through the Legislature that expanded 
local revenue-raising opportunities and that eliminated legal 
impediments to the economical operation of City services. 
Adhered to the spirit and letter of the safeguards contained in the 
funding loan legislation of 1957 keeping to a minimum the 
issuance of loans in anticipation of revenue; avoiding the carry-over 
of temporary loans into succeeding years; averting revenue shortfal1s; 
and curbing the escalation of property .tax refunds because of 
pervasi ve over-assessment of non-residential property. · 
11 
7. Corrected long-standlng abuses in the assessement of downtown 
propeh:y by lmplementlng the so-callcld ~qllallzatlon survey lnltlated 
by the prlor Administration. 
By most measures of financial performance, there was steady improvement in 
current operations of the City during the 1960-63 period, as indicated in Table 11. 
Financial Comparisons: Collins vs. Hynes 
Comparison of specific indicators for the first term of the Collins 
Administration with those of the Hynes Administration further confirms the 
remarkable fiscal turnaround: · 
1. The property tax rate decllned by 5 percent, without resort to short-
term devices and gimmickry, despite the net reduction of about $20 
million in taxable assessed valuations. This Contrasted with an annual 
2. 
3. 
average increase in the tax rate of 5 percent over the prior 10-year 
period when the net loss in taxable assessed valuations totalled $105 
million. 
The total number of employees on City and County payrolls as of 
February 1, 1964 was 1400, or 9 percent below that of February 1, 
1960. 
A more realistic schedule of fees and charges for fines, licenses and 
services -- parking fines, parking meter fees, health and hospital 
charges, alcoholic beverage license fees, etc. -- and new1y-enacted 


































authorization and City Council ordinance, were adopted, thereby 
relieving some of the pressure on the property tax. 
4. The City's net funded debt fell by over 7 percent between 1959 and 
1963, thereby renewing the downward trend interrupted by the 
funding loan issues of 1958 ahd 1959. 
5. In 1962, for the first time in over 15 years, the City's accounts 
showed "free cash'', indicating a cumulative net operating surplus in 
excess of outstanding taxes available for appropriation • . 
6. The steady improvement in its current account strengthened the · 
City's available supply of 47ash and reduced the necessity for 
borrowing as much in anticipation of revenue. Tax anticipation loans 
declined to a low of $25 million in 1962 as compared with the prior 
peak of $75 million in 1955. 
7. A new policy of recognizing abatements granted on assessed 
valuations of prior years when establishing annual abatement rolls of 
subsequent years helped reduce abatement applications by over 3,000 
between 1959 and 1963 and bolstered confidence in City assessment 
practices. 
Risks Cause Fiscal Strains 
Fiscal policies turned exceedingly erratic during the 1964-67 period, however. 
Spending and revenue disposition decisions resulted in sharp reversals of earlier 
positive trends. (It should be noted, incidentally, that Mayor Collins ran for Senator in 
1966.) One new and important constructive effort, however, was the intensification of 
activity by Boston's Mayor, a growing number of elected municipal officials and 
13 
segments of the business community to secure greater state aid through enactment of 
a sal es tax~ · 
Fresh evidence of fiscal strain became evident when the City's books for 1963 
wete 'dosed alid in 1964- decisions. Uncollected taxes seemed to be stalled at the $20 
million Ievel despite special efforts to collect back taxes. High rates of delinquency 
in s'ewer service charge payments were generating deficits that . had to be financed 
from 'property taxes. Late mailing of water service bills had caused a water service 
deficit at the close of 1963. City officials used available "free cash" as tax rate 
'tevenues and for recurring operating purposes after declaration of tax rates both in 
1963 and 1964-. Such "free cash" included taxes collected during the first three months 
of the .succeeding fiscal year as permitted by law, thereby contravening sound fiscal 
practice. Moreover, the downward trend in number of City and County employees was 
slightly reversed in 1964-. The consequences of relaxed fisca1 planning and contro1s and 
expedient spending and revenue decisions were a tax rate increase of about 4 percent 
in 1964, after four years of tax rate reduction; an operating deficit of $4.9 million at 
the end of 1964, the first since 1957; and disappointing financial performance both in 
1964- and 1965 that cu1minated in an unprecedented tax rate increase of 15 percent in 
1965. 
Perhaps the most serious financia1 gamble lay in decisions of 1963-67 to use 
accumulated "free cash" both for tax rate reduction and to cover supplementary 
appropdations in the face of escalating welfare costs, increasing expenses for pensions 
and debt service, and higher requirements for salaries and wages. In the 1966 fiscal 
year this, risk was further aggravated by a shortfall in state aid of over $6.5 million 





































results, as shown in Table III, were a revenue deficit of $17.5 mlllion and a net 
operating deficit of almost $17 million at the close of 1966. 
Virtual liquidation of available "free cash" also adversely affected Boston's cash 
flow. By 1967 temporary loans in anticipation of revenue had more than doubled and 
the interest expense for this purpose had quadrupled. In addition, a consistent pattern 
of delinquency in sewer service billings meant that annual deficits in this purportedly 
self-supporting enterprise had to be covered in tax levies, while faulty projection of 
welfare costs and deliberate under-appropriation for the welfare function forced the 
City to borrow for such current expenses, a self-defeating fiscal practice. Meanwhile, 
end-of-the year balances of uncollected taxes remained high at $20-25 million Ievels. 
The swing back in 1966 to a $101 taxrate from the $115 taxrate of 1965 was 
accomplished by taking advantage of every conceivable, legally-available revenue and 
receipt option (totalling about $5 million), plus the allocation of $14.5 million from 
"free cash" and·over $900,000 from unliquidated reserves. The non-recurring !ist of 
revenues and receipts included the redemption of tax titles, welfare borrowing and 
the sale of surplus property. (See Table III.) 
Fiscal prospects for 1967 appeared bleak because "free cash" had been depleted 
and the State had withheld over $6 million in school aid while the costs of City, 
County, and School operations were projected to increase by 13 percent. Between 
February 1, 1964 and February 1, 1967, there had been a net increase of over 1900 
employees on City, County and School payrolls, a rise of about 9 percent. This 
reversal all but wiped out the personnel reduction progress achieved during the early 
sixties. Fixed charges -- pensions, debt service and state assessements -- were 
estimated at 30 percent for 1967 over prior year levels. 
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Offsetting these negative factors, however, was state implementation of the 
1966 sales tax law, including its new provisions for a separate local aid fund and a 
higher degree of equalization in the distribution of school aid among cities and towns. 
As a result Boston's share of state aid in 1967, including reimbursement of funds 
frozen the prior year, was more than double the peak-year distribution of 1964. 
Despi te this new source of property tax relief and continued resort to such short-
sighted policies as borrowing for welfare ($5 million in 1967 and $2 million in 1966), 
however, the 1967 tax rate climbed to $117.80. 
IV. VINTAGE KEVIN H. WHITE: 1968-1975 
Hope Springs Eternal 
When officials of the new White Administration took their oaths of office in 
January 1968, they were probably heartened by the recovery they saw in the final 
accounts of the 1967 fiscal year, but somewhat chastened by the visible scars 
attributable to several short-sighted decisions of the 1964-66 period. The sizeab1e 
surplus accumulated between 1960 and 1963 had been virtually liquidated. Uncollected 
and abated property taxes had reached chronically high levels. City officials had 
resorted to borrowing to pay for current welfare needs, a depression era fiscal policy. 
The City's sewer service system was experiencing annual operating deficits. 
Newly-appointed financial officers must have seen hope, however, in the 
restoration of generat school aid in 1967 (which had been frozen in the past year), in 
the !arge distribution of aid based on the so-called state tax apportionment formula in 
that same year and in state reimbursement to Boston of general school aid withheld in 







































Their optimism undoubtedly was further buoyed by the expectation that recent 
state legislative decisions might mean more dependable, long-term relief of Boston's 
financial condition. Enactment of the limited sales tax in 1966 had broadened the base 
of state tax sources available for distribution as local aid, and it was generally 
predicted that the sales tax yield would increase i[l tandem with the state's economic 
growth. . : 
Moreover, the 1967 legislation transferring the administrative r·esponsibility and 
costs of the welfare function from cities and towns to the Commonwealth effective 
July l, 1968, which newly-elected Mayor White had used as leverage before resigning 
his position of Secretary of State meant both immediate and long-term municipal 
fiscal relief. For Boston this legislation lifted an estimated $17 million in net expense 
from the 1968 tax rate. 
Temporary Financial Stability and Danger Signals 
During the 1968-70 period, the City's finances were in a reasonable state of 
equilibrium, as shown in the accompanying summary of financia1 indicators (Table IV), 
mainly because of the shift of the welfare function to the state. Scattered among the 
key measures of financial performance, however, were dear-cut signals of fisca1 
strain. 
Revenue deficits persisted although they were of reduced scale. Large increases 
in appropriations for City operations were enacted to finance both new initiatives and 
programs, expansions that wiped out the net savings of $17 million a year from 
transfer of Boston's welfare system to the state, as demonstrated by the data in Table 
V. Costs for debt service were sharply higher due to bond issue commitments for 
urban renewal and related capital outlays. Contributory pensions also esca1ated. (See 
17 
... Table VI.) The City's fisca1 prob1ems were exacerbated by the rise in uncollected 
property taxes from the $20 million to the $30 million 1evel, by operating deficits in 
Boston's sewer service and water distribution systems, and by cash flow problems 
requiring 1arger issues of loans in anticipation of taxes and revenue. 
Particularly imprudent was the 1970 decisi<;m to appropriate $12.8 million from 
so-called surplus. Most of this surpJus was in the form of "free cash" that became 
available during the January - March period from settlement · of long-standing 
abatement appeals, mainly from railroads. This temporary windfall was used to 
finance the costs of relatively expensive collective bargaining agreements and 
additions to City and School Department payrolls. 
In addi tion, a series of unanticipated f inancial misfortunes in 1971 compounded 
the negative consequences of the risks taken in 1970. The Commonwealth withheld 
half of the school aid due to Boston as penalty for failure to implement school 
desegregation, thereby temporarily depriving the City of $14 million in state aid 
revenue. Uncollected City taxes soared by over one-third in 1971 to a new high of $41 
million, and abatements in excess of over1ay reserves increased from $4 million to $6 
million, indicating failure to recognize abatements in fixing subseqLient assessments. 
Revenue shortfalls generated a revenue deficit at the close of 1971 of almost $34 
million, which was primarily responsible for an end-of-year net operating deficit of 
over $27 million. 
The City's financial difficulties were further aggravated in 1971 by an increase 
of about 12 percent in appropriations over those of the prior year despi te continuing 
resort to appropriations from the windfalls of "free cash" generated by tax collections 
during the first three months of the calendar year . Expendi ture categories showing 









































KEY FINANCIAL INDICATORS, CITY OF BOSTON 
1960 - 1963 
(in millians of dollars) 
Net operating surplus or (deficit), 
end of year 
Accumulated surplus or (deficit), 
end of year 
Revenue surplus or (deficit) , 
end of year 
Abatements* 
Prior year overlay (deficits) 
raised 
Loans in anticipation of revenue 
Percent of tax r<;ite revenue 
Uncollected taxes, Dec. 31 
Sewer service surplus or (deficit) 
Water service surplus or (deficit) 










0 . 2 0.9 
1962 
$8.6 
14 . 9 
7.4 
7.9 



















KEY FINANCIAL INDICATORS 1 CITY OF BOSTON 
1964 - 1967 
(in millians of dollars) 
Net operating surplus or (deficit) , 
end of year 
Accumulated surplus or (deficit) 1 
end of year 
Revenue surplus or ,, (, 'ficit) 1 
end of year ( 
Appropriations from surplus 
Abatements* 
Prior year overlay (deficits) raised 
Deficit appropriations (sewer and 
water) 
Unealleeted taxesl en~ of year 
i(\(, 
Loans in anticipatidh of revenues 
% of tax rate rev~nues 
Bonded debt issued 
Bonded debt retf'red** 
Municipal relief ~q'<iffis 
·: ;·, 
Sales of city property - schools 
Sewer service surplus or (deficit) 
Water service surplus or (deficit) 






, $(6.0) 6.0 
8.9 1.1 
6.8 11.3 
( 0. 8) (0.5) 







(0. 4) (0.4) 
1.0 0.1 
















( 0. 7) 
0.2 







( 0. 1) 
















































KEY FINANCIAL INDICATORS , CITY OF BOSTON 
1968 - 1971 
Ne't operating surplus· or 
(deficit) , end of year 
Accumulated surplus or 
(deficit) , end of year 
Revenue surplus or (deficit) , 
end of year 
A~propriations from surplus 
Abatements* 
Prior year overlay 
(deficits) raised 
Deficit appropriations 
(sewer and water) 
Unealleeted taxes, 
end of year 
Loans in anticipation of 
revenue 
Percent of tax rate revenues 
.... 
. ,_, 
Bonded debt issu~d 
Bonded debt retired** 
Municipal welfare loans 
*Excluding adjustments. 




( 8. 5) (3.4) 
2.1 
9.3 18.5 
(1. 2) (1. 6) 










( 2. 4) 
12.8 
14.8 








**Exc1uding traffic tunne1 retirement and rapid transit debt. 
***We1fare transferred to state as of July 1, 1968. 







( 6. 0) 










TAX RATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR CITY MAINTENANCE AND WELFARE 
CITY OF BOSTON 
1967 - · 1970 
(in millions of dollars) 
Tax rate appropriations for 
City maintenance-
Minus tax rate appropriations 
for welfare 
Net appropriations 
Percent change in net appropria-



























































AcrUAL EXPENDITURES BY MAJOR CATJÜ;(JRY, GENERAL REVENUE FUNDS 
CITY OF BOsTON . 
1967 - 1971 
(in millions of ·dollars) 
Major Expense Category 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
City Maintenance $171.8 $178.9 $155.3 $188.4 $201.1 
County Maintenance 12.4 13.6 15.1 17.0 18.3 
Schoo1 Maintenance 57.3 64.2 72.6 83.4 95.2 
Debt Requirements 16.8 24.7 31.7 26.6 35.3 
Retirement Funds 16.7 17.6 20.1 17.7 34.2 
'~~~~ 
State Assessments 16.8 19.2 20.7 20.1 29.8 
/1 I~' i ' I 
Total $292 . 0 $318.2 $315.5 $353.2 $413 . 9 
Source: Tab1e 1, Boston's Fisca1 Crisis: Origins and So1utions, 













ACTUAL EXPENDITURES BY MAJOR DEPARTMENTS AND FUNCTIONS 
GENERAL REVENUE FUNDS 
CITY OF BOSTON 
1967 - 1971 
(in millians of dollars) 
Department or Function 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
City and County: 
Fire $17.1 $18.0 $20.7 $24.8 $26.2 
Health and Hospitals 32.0 36.5 39.3 48.2 52.8 
Police 22.6 27.0 28.5 38.2 41.0 
Public Works p.o 14.1 15.0 15.4 17.5 
Welfare 49.5 37.3 1.3 
Employee Hea1th Ins. 1.9 3.3 3.4 4.4 5.1 
County Courts 7.8 8.5 9.5 10.6 11.3 
County Cerreetions 2 . 2 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.7 
Schoo1 : 
Adminü=!tration 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.4 
Instruction 44.5 49.8 55.7 63.2 73.1 
Fixed charges: 
Redemption of City Debt 12.2 18.7 24.5 17.5 23.6 
Interest on City Debt 3.8 5.0 5.8 7.4 9.7 
Interest on Temp. 1oans 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.9 

















Source: Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C, Boston's Fisca1 Crisis, December 1976, 








































AcrUAL REVENUES BY MAJOR SOURCE, GENERAL REVENUE FUNDS 
CITY OF BOSTON 
1967 - 1971 
(in millians of dollars) 
Major Source 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Property Taxes $166.9 $188.3 $211.2 $237.4 $266.8 
Departmental Revenue 32~5 37.6 44.2 56.8 61.7 
Revenue from State 79.5* 70.4 52.4 55.7 44.5** 
fvlotor Vehicle Excise 
Tax 9.2 8.9 8.7 9.8 9.2 
Other 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Total $288.4 $306.1 $317.1 $360.5 $383.3 
*Includes increase of $16 mi1lion in state tax apportionment distribution 
over 1966, release of $6.3 mil1ion in c . 70 school and withheld in 1966, 
and $9.2 million in c.70 school aid (none received by Boston in 1966). 
**Excludes $14.2 mi11ion in c.70 schoo1 aid withhe1d in 1971 and reimbursed 
in 1972. 



















NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, CITY OF BOSTON 




























Public Works Department 1,385 1,403 1,375 1,416 
Welfare Department 

















*Data excludes employees on federally-assisted model cities and safe 
streets programs. 
**Data includes employees on federally-assisted payrolls. 





I change, !1.:967-71 
+ 9% I 
+ 13% I 
+ 19% 
+ 12% I 
+ 3% 
+ 22% 
+ 19% I 
+ 4% I 




























top of a School Committee deficit of $1.6 million at the close of 1970; ßoston's share 
of the MBTA deficit, an increase of 62 percent to $25 million, thereby wiping out the 
benefits of the 1969 legislation reducing ßoston's proportionate assessment for the 
transit system; debt service, up by almost $9 million or 32 percent; and contributory 
retirement funds, up by 93 percent, mainly because of the deliberate decision to defer 
the !arge increase for contributory pensions into the next fiscal year. (See Tables VI 
and VII for details on expendi tures over the 1967-71 period and T able VIII for details on 
revenues during this period.) ßorrowing in anticipation of revenue rose sharply, from 
$85 million in 1970 to $130 million in 1971. . Deficits in the City's water and sewer 
utili ties continued to worsen. 
Self-Imposed Austerity 
The financial urgency that surfaced early in 1971 (a mayora1 ty election year) 
prompted City officials to launch a personnel reduction program with the goal of 
reducing the City's payroll by 500 employees within a six-month period. As indicated 
in Table IX, the number of City employees, excluding those in the Welfare 
Department, had increased by 16 percent between 1967 and 1971 -- from 13,684 to 
15,851. (Omitted from these figures are employees in the federally-assisted Model 
Cities and Safe Streets programs.) Of the overall net increase of over 2100 City 
employees during this period, over 1000 or almost half of the total were added to the 
Health and Hospital Department (which showed an increase of 22 percentover 1967), 
while the Police Department's staff grew by 545 employees, equivalent to a 19 percent 
rise. These large increases in the number of Health and Hospital employees occurred 
despite the fact that the three municipal hospitals (City Hospital, Mattapan Chronic 
Disease Hospital and Long Island Hospital) were experiencing steady declines in the 
19 
average number of patient days and in-patient occupancy rates. Offsetting this trend, 
however, was the new emphasis on the developrnent and expansion of neighborhood 
health centers. As for the significant rise in Police Department employees, the 
Administration's own task force report confirmed major findings and reiterated 
recommendations of earlier outside police surveys completed in 1948 and 1970 
concerning overstaffing and outmoded methods, but initial implementation failed to 
offset staff expansion, and large-scale change would not take place until the 
impending fiscal crisis of 1973-74. 
Approaching Fiscal Crisis 
Returned to office by the November election of 1971, the City Administration 
seemingly failed to recognize and/or acknowledge the fact that its finances had 
degenerated from an incipient state during the first term to a new serious condition by 
early 1972. The property tax levy for 1972 increased by 12 percent over the prior year 
and followed record-high percentage increases of more than 18 percent in 1970 and 16 
percent in 1969 over the previous year. Moreover, after having used up the remaining 
small balance of "free cash" balance in 1971, ßoston's free cash cupboard was bare. 
Despite a one-year windfall of $6 milllon in state highway aid (under a new local 
highway aid formula) and initial distribution of lottery funds ($3.7 million) 
supplemented by state reimbursement of $14.2 million of withheld school aid, the City 
ended up 1972 with another !arge revenue deficit due to shortfalls in departmental 
receipts and motor vehicle excise taxes. The revenue deficit was the major cause of 
the 1972 net operating deficit of almost $16 million; the City's accumulated operating 







































The City's finances in 1972 were marred by a growing list of weakening 
indicators. In addition to constant1y rising sewer and water systems deficits, which 
exceeded $7 million in 1972, over $3 million had to be raised in deficit appropriations 
to cover prior-year salary and wage increases. The level of uncollected taxes had 
climbed to $58 million from $41 million by the end of 1972, thereby forcing the City to 
borrow $180 million in anticipation of revenue, equivalent to 36 percent of tax rate 
receipts and $50 million above prior year requirements. 
Fiscal Stabilization Efforts 
Over the next 30-month period (January 1, 1973- June 30, 1975) City officials 
took steps to stem the tide of fiscal deterioration by re-instituting an employee 
reduction program, an effort which accomplished 85 percent of its overall goal of 1600 
fewer employees over the next 18 months, and by careful utilization in each tax rate 
period of federal General Revenue Sharing (GRS) funds, which first became availa.ble 
in the 1972 fiscal year. Boston transferred $29 million from federal revenue sharing 
funds in the 1973-74 fiscal year and $21 million from this same source in the 1975 
fiscal year to cover certain City appropriations. By the end of the 197 5 fiscal year 
there was still a $45 million balance in GRS funds available for appropriation through 
transfer. 
Also of signlficant assistance in temporarily stabilizing finances during this 
period were growth in the property tax base, large increases in state aid, mainly 
general school aid and categorical grants for certain school purposes. By 197 5 Boston's 
taxable valuations had increased by over $100 milllon over 1971 to $1.78 billion. 
Boston's share of state aid rose by over $60 million between 1971 and 1975, as shown 
in Table IX, because of prior legislation making changes in school aid distribution 
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' formulas and eliminating the so-called machinery distribution to · cities and towns. 
Additional fiscal benefits came from legislative permission to spread the 1972 MBTA 
deficit over the next 18 months instead of being assessed in a sing1e year and 1973 
legislative authorization for state financing of one-half the MBTA deficit assessable · 
on ci ties and towns. The latter legislation reduced Boston's share of the 197 5 MB TA 
assessment from a potential $40 million to $25 million. A reduction in Boston's share 
of local highway aid because of formula revision in 197 5 was offset by acceleration of 
the lottery fund distribution and by advance state funding of so-called Chapter 766 aid 
for special education, as shown in Table X. 
Thus, according to the performance indicators listed in Table XI, Boston's 
financial condition improved slightly during the 30 months ending June 30, 1975. 
Annual expenditure and receipts were roughly in balance although sewer and water 
deficits chargeable to · taxes · had reached a new high of $9.5 million. The City's cash 
flow problern was alleviated, he1ped somewhat by the shift from annua1 to semi-annual 
payment of property taxes under the statutory change in the muncipal fiscal year to 
coindde with both the federal and state fiscal calendars. (This had been a City of 
Boston legislative initiative.) 
Implementation of the City's personnet reduction policy through attrition of 
permanent and provisional employees, which had been inaugurated late in 1972, was 
particularly instrumental in achieving some fiscal stability. (See Table XII.) During 
the 18-month period ending June 30, 1974, the number of City and County employees 
declined by over 1400 or 8.5 percent. It should be noted, however, that budgetary 
savings from this austerity program primarily offset higher personnet costs generated 
by staff additions during the prior 6Y:z years. The number of personnet filling 

























ACTUAL REVENUES BY SELECTED SOURCE, GENERAL REVENUE FUNDS 





General Revenue Funds 
Net collections of current 
year's property taxes 
Net collections of prior 
years' property taxes 
City departmental revenues 
County departmental revenue 







Revenues from state: 
State tax apportionment 
School aid, c.70 
School aid, c.70 
withheld in prior years 
School aid, c.69-71 
Construction of school 
projects 




II Highway Fund 
I 
I 
Lottery Aid Fund 
Federa1 revenue sharing 















1971 - 1975 
(in mi11ions of do11ars) 
1972* 1974** 1975*** 
$289.6 $445.8 $301.5 
3.6 6.4 4.7 
12.9 20.6 9.3 
6.3 9.8 7.4 
37.7 69.1 52.6 
2.0 3.8 
' 
37.3 62.7 51.3 
14.2 
3.7 3.8 3.1 
2.5 4.0 10.5 
7.7 7.9 8.7 
1.7 4.8 2.1 
a 0.5 4.lb 
6.0 4.3 1.8 















b. Inc1udes $3.0 mi11ion for racia1 imba1ance and $1.1 mi11ion for Chapter 766 aid. 






















KEY FINANCIAL INDICATORS I CITY OF BOSTON 
1972 - 1975 
1972 
Revenue surplus or (deficit) 1 
end of year $(22.8) 
Appropriations balance or 
{deficit) , end of year*** 6.9 
(Oeficit) appropriations: 
Prior year pay raises ( 3 .1) 
Estimated receipts 
Se wer and water deficits ( 7. 3) 
1\baternents**** 20.8 
Prior year over1ay (deficits) 
raised . 3.0 
Unco1lected taxes, end of 
year 58.0 
Loans in anticipation of 
revenue 180.0 
% of tax rate revenues 36% 
Bonded debt issued 84.0 
Bonded debt retired***** 22.3 
*For 18 rnonths, 1/1/73 - 6/30/74. 
**Fisca1 year, 7/1/74 - 6/30/75 

























***Difference between adjusted tax rate appropriations and net expenditures. 
Adjusted appropriations inc1ude prior-year appropriations carried forward, 
transfers and deficit appropriations. 
****Exc1uding adjustrnents. 
*****Exc1uding traffic tunne1 retirernent and rapid transit. 
TABLE XII 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, CITY OF BOSTON 
1971 - 1975 
Feb. 1 
No. of Employees 1971 
City Departments* 16,211 
County Departments 1,373 
School Departments** 8,157 
Total 25,741 
Fire Department 2,127 
Health and Hospitals 
Department 
Police Department 












































*Data excludes employees on federally-assisted model cities and 
safe streets programs. 
**Data includes employees on federally-asssted payrolls. 
Source: Annual Reports, Auditing Department, City of Boston. 
I 
I 
Per cent I 
Change, 
I 1971-75 




I + 1% 

































CITY OF BOSTON PERSONNEL, l/l/68 AND 6/30/74 
City Department 
Police 







Boston Retirement Board 
Election 
Public Werks 
Parks and Recreation 
Health and Hospitals 
Real Property 





















Youth Activities Commission 58 
Veterans Services 7l 


































































Source: Boston Municipal Research Bureau, "Another View of Boston's 
Personnel Reduction Program", September 30, 1974, Special 
Report No. 45. 
TABLE ' XIV 
PERSONNEL IN MAYOR' S OFFICE AGENCIES . ' 
l/l/68 AND 6/30/74 
Agencies under Mayor's Control 
Mayor's Office 
u.s. Bond Allotment Plan 
Public Celebrations 
Office of Public Service 
Office of Human Rights 
Office of Cultural Affairs 
coond. Council on Drug Abuse 
Development & Industrial Comm. 
Comm. on Affairs of Elderly 
Board of Rent Appeals 
Safe Streets Act 
Policy Analysis & Planning 
Office of the Boston Bicentennial 
Animal Control Commission 
*23 federally-funded employees. 





































source: Boston Municipal Research Bureau, "Another View of Boston's 







































and mid-197 4 while the number of County employees increased by over 200, for an 
overall increase of 625. (These figures excluded Welfare Department employees 
absorbed by the State in mid-1968 and employees on federally-funded payrolls.) 
As shown in Table XIII, the net increase of over 400 City employees was due to 
'Police Department staff expansions, mainly to irnplement the reduced-hour work 
week, and the staffing of 12 new activities direct1y under the Mayor's control, as 
indicated in Table XIV. These staff increases offset ernployee reductions in the Parks 
and Recreation and Public Works Department, reductions due to shifts from force 
account (using City employees) to contractual delivery of certain services. 
Imminent Fiscal Emergency 
Lingering weaknesses in the City's financial structure the inequities in 
assessments and failures to recognize abatements, exacerbated by !arge percentages 
of uncollected taxes and the troubling trend in tax foreclosures, and poli tical 
difficul ties in sustaining personne I reduction progress -- were ominous signals in 197 5 
that basic deficiencies in Boston's fiscal practices had not yet been remedied. The 
special factors contributing to tax rate stabilization between 1972 and 197 5 could 
conceivably give Boston only one more year of grace. A serious fiscal emergency was 
clearly on the horizon. A substantial operating deficit for the 197 5 fiscal year had 
been averted only by wholesale transfers of available surpluses to deficient accounts 
in closing the City's books. A School Department operating deficit of under $1 million 
in 1972 had dimbed to $8 million by 1975. For the first t~me in almost two decades, 




V. WHITE'S MIDDLE YEARS: 1976-1980 
The Roundhouse Punch 
After four years of a constant tax rate, the taxpayer of Boston was shocked in 
the Fall of 1976 (fiscal 1977) when Mayor White announced that property taxes would 
rise by 28.5 percent or $56.20 per $1000 of assessed value. This was the largest tax 
increase in the City's history. A Boston Globe reporter called it a "roundhouse" punch 
that had Boston taxpayers "reeling and wendering what happened." The explanation 
according to the Globe, was that "city services have become more expensive, there's 
less help from the state and federal governments, inflation continues to eat up savings 
and four years of a stable tax rate had to end sometime." (September 17, 1976). 
Mayor White blamed the increase on less federal and state aid that year and "most 
importantly'' on the School Department where ''··· costs are totally out of control." 
(Boston Globe, September· 17, 1976) 
Reaction to the tax hike was quick and furious. Taxpayers were outraged. 
Bankers feared that homeowners -- who were facing average tax bill increases of 
$400 -- would not pay their escrow taxes and might even "abandon" their homes. 
(Boston Globe, September 17, 1976) The Boston Municipal Research Bureau called for 
strict control of City and School spending and warned that without such, next year's 
property tax rate could soar again, by more than $30. 
One analyst and journaHst concluded, on the other hand, that Mayor White rhay 
have been getting "a bum rap, all the way" (Boston Herald, September 23, 1976) 
Although the tax rate was up by 28.5 percent, he noted, "the cost of everything ~he 








































Warren Brookes wrote: 
In short, White may have done a pretty good job in holdingdown the growth 
of government spending since 1972, in spi te of the rapidly rising prices on 
everything. ··• (O)ur research shows that he may well be among the more 
fiscally conservative mayors. This does not mean there is not room for 
additional pruning and belt tightening but there may not be as much 'fiscal 
fat' as the furor would suggest. 
Brookes went on to state that high property taxes in Boston were due to two 
factors: over-reliance on the property tax, and a steadily declining share of state 
revenues sent back to cities and towns as local aid. Brookes claimed that the " ••• city 
is being short-changed by the state government by more than $35 million" (September 
23, 1976). 
A month later Warren Brookes wrote a 5-part series on the City's finances. His 
current concern was that: 
... the city may well be moving at an alarming pace toward a New York 
City-type financial crisis within the next six to nine months. (October 18, 
1976) 
He warned that: 
How well and how soon we meet this cns1s may determine the future 
economic and sociological hea1th of the city. (October 18, 1976). 
Brookes's series called for specific cuts of $64 million in City spending and $26 
million in additional state aid: a $90 million solution of the City's fiscal problem. 
On the spending side Brookes' analysis indicated that the City was being operated 
by 4300 more employees "than it realistically needs to do the job", which, if cut, would 
generate a $64 million dollar saving. 
His specific proposals for budget cuts were: 
1. Hospitals. Brookes argued that in 1967 the hospi tal was a 1000 bed 
facility with a staff of 3459. By 1976, the City Hospital had been 
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converted to a 400-bed facility with a staff of 3700! Brookes 
proposed that 700 positions be cut. 
2. CETA. Brookes' analysis noted that almost 1200 CETA employees 
had been added to City payrolls since 1967. He argued that these 
jobs should replace city payroll positions -- "take from the city's 
own payroll 1200 positions, equivalent to those which are now funded 
by the Federal program." 
3. Schools. Using a ratio of students-to-total personnel of 11.8, the 
ratio which had existed in 1972, instead of the 9.3 ratio of 1976, 
Brookes recommended a reduction of 1700 employees. 
4. Police and Fire. Brookes compared Boston to other cities and argued 
for a reduction of 400 police officers and 300 firefighters to save 
about $12 million. 
On the revenue side the Brookes solution was for the state to absorb Suffolk 
County expenses (courts and corrections) into the state budget (with a total annual 
budget of $26 million at the time), and to send more state aid to the City. Brookes 
was particularly concerned that all local governments in Massachusetts had been 
"shortchanged" in local aid. He argued that between 197 5 and 1977 state tax revenues 
had risen by over $700 million, while local aid was level funded. As a result local aid 
declined from 37 percent to 27 percent of state revenues. Brookes, among others, was 
critical of the Governor and the Legislature for solving their fiscal problems by 
"socking it to the cities and towns". (Brookes, Boston Herald, January 4, 1977). 
Budget cuts of $64 million and $26 million in additional state aid was Brookes' 









































In retrospect the City had not been over the brink. In fact an econotniG 
renaissance was quite visible. Subsequent to the tax rate jump öf 28.5 percent in 1976, 
the City held the tax rate for three succeeding years and without significant cuts in 
spending. Total expenditures rose by 20 percent between fiscal 1971 and fiscal 19gOi 
Only in 1981 did the tax rate rise again -- to $272.70 (by 7.8 percent), before 
Proposition 2~ forced a three-year reduction beginning in 1982. 
The Salutions This Time 
Why didn't the City go over the brink? Because of a series of evel'lts increasing 
the City"s. revenue and absorbing some of its costs between fiscal 1978 and 1980. 
The· significant factors were: 
l. For fiscal 1977 the City's ac"'tual revenues,, excluding those f'rom 
property taxes, exceeded or·iginal estimates by $46· mill1oli. Revenue 
surpluses were. mainly unantidpated windfalls and new sources -- $1.5· 
mi:Ilion of additional reimbursements frorn the· Commonwealth f.or 
school constructi:on, and for pdor year's cost of living reimb~:~rs·e­
ments for re:tked teachers~ $17 million from additl.ol'fal F'ederaf. 
General Revenue Sharing !unds and a. new program of. P'ederal- Lo.cai, 
FisG:al A·ssis·tance. 
Z. Establishment of an independent: Water and Sewer Cornmfssi'on in 
1977. By spf.nning off the water.· and sewer- resportstoili tte·s to"' a. 
separate self-supporting. entity, the City weis able· to elimina,te ann·uaJ: 
recurring, defici ts in waterc and' s-ewer: operations and recover ~n 
accumulated defidt in· the C'i,ty's water and sewer er'ltetpr'ise. 
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accounts as · of -June 30,. 1977 of about $25 million (Official 
Statement, August .1 ,· 1977, P•. 27). 
3. In. fiscal 1979, the state increased direct local aid by revising the 
education distribution formula while enacting a - partial takeover of 
county · court costs which tagether gave the City an increase of $68 
million in additional funds. Although the state initiated these moves 
to affect reductions in municipal tax rates in fiscal 1979, such was 
not forthcoming in Boston. State officials, particularly Governor 
Dukakis, were quite upset that the City did not use some of these 
funds to reduce property taxes, especially in the era of Proposition 13 
(California) and with the prospects for a referendum on Proposition 
. 2Yz in Massachusetts (1980). 
~. In the 1980· fiscal year the balance of court take-overs was 
implemented providing the City with additional funds with which to 
hold the taxrate steady. 
While the tax rate held steady at $252.90 for four years, (1977 -80), the 
underlying financial indicators in Table XV showed the City burdened with carrying an 
annual appropriation deficit of about $25 million a year and an overlay deficit of over 
$20 million per year ; Fortunately, there also was a revenue sUrplus in ~ out of the 5 
years •. 
, A number .of additi-onal factors are w.orthy· of note in explaining finances for ·the 
1977-80 period: · 
1. Each · year expenditure over-runs, according to reports of the City 
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FINANCIAL INDICATORS 
1976 - 1980 
(millions of dollars) 
1977 1978 
45.6 3.1 
( 17. 7) (21.8) 
(25.4) ( 17. 5) 
(20. 7) (15.0) 
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police, health and hospitals, and occasionally county expense. Both 
at the beginning and end of this period, the City administration was 
pointing the finger at excessive school costs. Between 1975 and 1981 
the student population had declined by 20,000 while staffing had 
remained constant. 
2. Overlay reserves during this period averaged 6 percent of annual 
gross levies while the actual total of taxes abated averaged 7.5 
percent, portending the impending Tregor crisis. As shown in Table 
XV overlay deficits had worsened in these years. The overlay deficit 
for fiscal 1980 reflects the deliberate policy of deferring refunds for 
abatements, not a diminution of the problem. 
3. The bailouts during this period were of two types. State 
reimbursement for school construction and the water and sewer 
deficit reimbursements were one-time, non-recurring funds. These 
one-time receipts helped reduce annual operating deficits, but it 
should be noted that such temporary sources would continually 
reappear in Boston's financial history. On the other hand, the county . 
court takeover and revision of the educational aid formu1a were more 
permanent sources of future revenues. 
VI. THE VINEGAR YEARS: TREGOR AND PROPOSITION 2~, 1981-84 
A Most Disruptive Period 
The fiscal 1981-82 crisis, revolving around the Tregor court case and the 
implementation of Propostion 2Y2, was perhaps the most disruptive period in the City's 
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recent history and contributed to the, poli tica:1 weakening of a very strong mayor. The 
.initial effects of what the Mayor once described as the equivalent pf a hurricane an,d a 
tornado hitting the. city simultaneously were dramatic. Their resul~ was constituent 
unrest and poli tical ·turnioil,. leading to a number of dempnstr.ations and takeovers of 
< •• 
fire and police stations that had been closed and in the neighborhoods; even the 
stopping of traffic f1owing through the East Boston to Boston tunnels. The City was 
forced to reduce i ts budget by $7 5 million _from fiscal 1981 to 1982, resu~ting in laybffs 
• of some 2,700 city-funded employees and over 700 tenured teachers. (BMRB, January 
.12, 1982). ' 
-In anticipation of this drama the Boston Municipal Research Bureau (BMRB) 
issued a report entitled "Living on Less: Boston's Challerige for 1981" (February 1981). 
The Bureau highlighted three facts that were portending a year of "continued financial 
crisis and cutbacks for Boston city government" -- 1) the impact of Proposition 2}l; 2) 
the impact of abatements. under the Tregor court decision; and, 3) the "school budget 
saga". 
The impact of 2}l was estimated as a $78 million reduction in property taxes. 
When calculated on the basis of the City's discretionary budget, the Bureau expected 
the cuts on the City's budget "will hit not just what many consider governmental frills, 
but the heart of municipal services." The Bureau estimated that first-year personnet 
layoffs could reach 5,000 employees, almost 40 percent of the work force. 
As to the abatement liability, ·the Bureau estimated a contingency of between 
$50 million and $100m. Tagether with an estimated $40 million school deficit for 1981 
this led the Bureau to "raise the question of whether there will be enough cash on hand 
to get through the f.iscal year" .(p.2.). There was some speculation that schools mi~ht 









































While the Bureau saw some hard times ahead, it also saw some silver linings in 
the ominous storm clouds. "Time of crisis also present opportunities" (p.4.}. What tl:le 
Bureau had in mind was management controls " ••• (O)peration of the city can never be 
really improved until some sound systems are put in place" (p.5). 
In addition to management systems, the Bureau said it would also push for a 
change in administrative structure. Most particularly, the Bureau was looking for a 
chief fiscal officer who would select key financial officials such as the assessor, 
treasurer, and personnet director. 
Finally, the Bureau ~dentified a need for fiscal controls and management changes 
in the School Department. It sponsored a special study of this issue by Marcy 
I ,:. :(· ' 
Murningham under ttie guidance of an advisory group tonsisting of Joseph Slavet, 
Joseph Barresi and Joseph Cronin. 
The Bureau was prescient in its forecast of silver linings. Several of the fiscal 
1 solutions adopted during this period included some new management controls for City 
financial operations. 
· The City's first effort to deal with the impacts of Proposition 2~ and Tregor was 
· .. to implement the recomm·endations of a select, internal committee. This · committee 
recdmmended that $97 million be reduced from the City's budget. · Among the 
austerity measures recommended were 25 percent cuts in Police and Fire Departtnent 
budgets, a 30 percent reduction in the Public Werks budget, a 35 percent reduction.in 
the budgets of mayoral agencies and a massive 60 percent cut in the budget of the 
Parks and Recreation Department. These recommendations were received as 






As the Boston G~obe editorialized: 
The financ~al walls around .Boston are <;:losingin. And, to date, the secret · 
I 
door thro~gh which city . residents will escape unacceptably harsh 
reductions ~n ci ty services has not ~een located. (December 5, 1980). 
Boston's abaten:ient/ assessing problems have been of a recurring nature• Because 
of its relative importaiice to Boston's past and to the prospects for Boston's future, the 
next section digresses to present the background necessary to understand assessing, 
abatements, overlay deficits and the Tregor court case. 
i 
; ' 
Digression: An Historkai Summary of Assessing Inequities in Boston 
The property tax has been utilized by Massachusetts cities and towns since 
colonial times and Massachusetts has co'nsistently tended to be more dependent upon 
the property, tax as a revenue source than most other states. 
Historically, the administration of the property tax has been characterized by 
complexity and diversity. Because the property tax was a locally administered tax, its 
effects on each of the 351 cities and towns in the Commonwealth was different. In 
general, tax rates were highest in the larg~st and oldest cities. In Boston the effective 
rate at which property was taxed oftef) . varied fro~ one class of property owner (e.g., 











next. It was , these . inter- and intra-class differences which led to considerable . I 
litigation during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Inequities in the administration of the local property tax arose from three I 
factors: 
1. Assessed values seldom 
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Although the General Laws of the Commonwealth required assessors to assess 
property at its "fair cash valuation" 1, property was typically assessed at less than 
market value. Such fractional valuation was often the natural result of property value 
appreciation in a community which did not periodically update assessment. 
The use of fractional valuations was also reinforced by State practices. 
Fractional valuations could result in larger amounts of state aid because of 
inconsistencies in the state's process for equalizing municipal valuations, the basis for 
distributing most state aid. While many of the inconsistencies have since been 
corrected, a pattern continued for a long while which allowed communl ties which 
assessed at a low fraction of market value to receive proportionately more state aid 
than otherwise similar communities that were near full valuation. 
Across the board underassessment patterns generally created a new cycle which 
further accentuated inequities. Cities and towns were forced to compensate for low 
levels of assessment by raising the tax rate to a level that would be unacceptable if 
properties were assessed at full value.2 Any form of reassessment would then be 
opposed by taxpapers who were afraid that upward adjustments would not be 
accompanied by a reduction in property tax rates. In addition, the class of taxpayers 
underassessed relative to other classes had an increasing stake in opposing a 
reassessment effort that would lead to an increase in its share of the tax burden. 
2. Fractional assessments were often varied according to the type or class of 
property. Residential classes of property were valued at different 
percentages ·of market value than assessments for industrial and 
commercial property. 
The system of fractional assessment, which existed throughout the 
Commonwealth and was most notable in Boston, was in Violation of the Massachusetts 
Constitution which forbade the i_mposition of taxes upon one class of persans or 
property at a different rate from that which was applied to other classes.3 The 
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legislature and courts had long been aware of the practice of applying different 
assessment/market ratios to various classes of property. Such practices were 
tolerated for many years. 4 
3. Similar property classes contained substantial variations in assessment 
ratios. 
Intra-dass inequities in assessment ratios were attributed to a number of 
factors. Throughout the Commonwealth a recently sold parcel of property was more 
lii<ely to be revalued than one which had not changed ownership. Properties in 
declining neighborhood~ \t.ere likely to have higher assessment-to-rnarket-value ratios 
than properties which were located in more attractive neighborhoods where market 
values were rising. Differences in the rate of inflation in housing prices in different 
neighborhoods was often responsible for assessment ratio disparities. 5 
Judicial Response: The Bettigole Decision 
Prior to 1961 a taxpayer whose property was assessed higher than other 
properties in the community could not obtain any relief from the courts unless the 
taxpayer could prove that his or her property was absolutely overassessed (that is, at 
more than 100 percent of its market value). In 1961, the State Supreme Court ruled in 
Bettigole vs. Assessors of Springfield 343 Mass. 233, 178 N.E. 2nd 10 (1961), that all 
property must be assessed at full value and that fractional assessments or assessments 
below 100 percent of value, as weil as nonuniform assessments were unconstitutional. 
The Bettigole decision clearly stated the law of the Commonwealth, but 
enforcement was left in the hands of city or town officials. Following Bettigole, many 
of the smal1er towns in Massachusetts revalued their property. Cities and !arger 
towns, however, sought to avoid revaluation because, in many cases, they also had a de 







































in a significant tax burden shift from business property to residential property. Since 
local officials were reluctant to revalue, the only option was for at least ten taxpayers 
of a communmity to bring suit seeking to forcesuch action. Local officials were often 
able to negotiate one or more of the taxpayers out of the suit and thereby avoid the 
threat of court-ordered revaluation. This strategy was particularly successful in 
Boston. 
The Sudbury Decision and 100% Fair Cash Valuation 
In 1974, with the decision of the state's highest court in Sudbury v. State Tax 
Commission, assessing policy underwent a fundamental change. The Supreme Judicial 
Court addressed the problern of continued underassessment in the Commonwealth by 
requiring every city and town to assess its property at 100 percent of market value, 
thus ending any residual legal basis for the fractional assessment of property within 
and among classes.6 lmportant in this decision was .recognition of the state 
Department of Revenue's responsibility to enforce compliance with the state law. 
For communities which assessed all property at a relative1y high but uniform 
percentage of full value, the impact of 100 percent valuation was minimal. However, 
in communities in which a system of de facto classification had developed, the impact 
of 100 percent valuation was more severe. A move to full valuation wou1d 
substantially disrupt the existing patterns of tax burdens and preferences which had 
resulted from fractional valuation. In 1972, equalization of assessments in the City of 
Boston would have resulted in an average incease of 20 percent in property taxes on 
residential properties, while taxes on commercial and industrial properties would have 
decreased by an average of 14 percent.7 Statewide, an estimated $265 million in 
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property taxes would have been shifted from commercial property owners to individual 
homeowners. 8 
The Political Response: Classification 
In response to the Sudbury threat, Mayor Whlte initiated a constitutional 
referendum proposal authorizing classification of property for assessment purposes. 
Classification could be implemented in Massachusetts only by amending the state 
constitution through a statewide referendum process which required four years. A 
similar classification amendment had been on the ballet in 1970 and was severely 
defeated. In November 1978, however, the voters of the Commonwealth approved a 
classification amendment by a two-to-one margin. The constitutional amendment and 
enabling legislation expressed a legislative and popular intent to treat residential 
property more favorably than commercial or industrial property • .. 
The Tregor Decision 
The illegal, de facto classification system remained in existence whlle individual 
cities and towns in the Commonwealth developed plans for revaluation. In March of 
1979, the' continued existence of thls system was dealt a serious blow, and cities and 
towns, particularly the City of Boston, were faced with the problern of tax abatements 
until the individual revaluation efforts were successfully completed. 
In Tregor v. Board of Assessors of the City of Boston,9 decided on March 23, 
1979, the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that until revaluation was completed, a 
taxpayer could make at least a prima fade case of disproportionate assessment if he 
showed that hls property were assessed at a percentage of fair cash value greater than 







































The court .further indicated that a taxpayer who proved such disproportionate 
assessment was entitled to have the assessed value to market value ratio for his 
property reduced to the average ratio of the "most favored class" of properties 
generally single family homes. Relying on policy considerations rather than statutory 
or constitutional authority, the court held that an order to reduce the taxpayer's 
assessment level to match the assessment to value ratio of the lowest class 
"vindicated the right of the aggrieved taxpayer by conforming his assessment to those 
of the most favored taxpayers".lO The court indicated t'hat the lowest class remedy 
was chosen to- provide some incentive to assessors in al1 Cities and towns within the 
Commonwealth to comply with the fair cash valuation standard set forth in the 
General Laws and ignored for many years. 
As a result of the Tregor case, eitles and towns which were not assessed 
uniformly or at full cash value faced several immediate problems: (1) the return of 
collected property taxes through Pending applications for abatement; (2} increased 
overlays in the tax levy to cover abatements; (3) reductions in assessments on 
commercial and industrial property in future years to avoid abatement appeals. 
Throughout the Commonwealth, taxpayers who had appeals pending an appeal 
based on disproportionate assessment of a prior year's tax would receive a reduction in 
assessed value to the lowest assessment/value ratio which existed. Because most 
eitles and towns previously assessed commercial, industrial and utility property at a 
higher ratio, those communities were required to reduce such assessments to the Ievel 
of a single-family home or whatever substantial class of property had the lowest ratio. 
For the City of Boston, the effects of the Tregor decision carried with it an 
estimated liability of $154 million in abatements. The chickens had come home to 
roost in fiscal 1982. 
37 
'· ·' 
the -Solutidn to the Cit)"s Finances: Fiscal 1982 and 1983 
The secend half of fiscal 1981 to the end of fiscal 1983 were hard years -for the 
City. Budget cutbacks, - layoffs, and political discord dominated the landscape. 
However, the City emerged from these 2Yz years with a number of major 
a·~complishments. First, it was able to cover the Tregor liability, through a 
combination of bonding and safe of the Hynes' auditorl-um, thereby mitigating the 
'" • financhd impact. Second, it finished a complete revaluation of city property, thereby 
deaning up :its act in assessing fofthe firsttime in ·its history. Third, it agreed to (the 
d -~ ·C?'ity's financial team had actually helped design) a humber of reforms in management 
controls which were ·'inclüded in the overall financial solution. The importance of each 
of these to this period and for the future of the City is the rernaining part of this 
-period's vignette. 
Clearly, Proposition 2Yz was dealing with the inordinately high level of property 
taxes in Boston. In addition revaluation, supplemented by classification, which was 
implemented in 1983, finally established full and fair - rnarket assessments and ended 
the abatement bleeding of cominercial taxes. But it was the Tregor Bill, or more 
appropriately the Funding Loan Act of 1982, which provided both funding for previous 
overlay deficits ·and introduced some fiscal reform measures to improve the way the 
City was managed. 
In 1982, the City sought to issue bonds to finance Tregor-related abatements. 
The idea was to authorize the City to borrow an amount to be deposited in a separate 
fund dedicated solely to paying the abateri1ents· for disproportionate assessments and 
to reimburse the City for payments already made in such cases. To facilitate their 







































which took about a year frorn initial proposal through many revisions to final passage, 
had an unusually checkered history. The political wear and tear was extensive. 
The Tregor bill provided, among other things, for the issuance of bonds to fund, 
in part, disproportionate assessment tax refunds. The legislation set up a Dispro-
portionate Assessment Fund (DAF) for such refunds. The amount put into this fund 
included a $45 million, ten-year bond issue, and proceeds from the sale of the John B. 
Hynes Veterans Auditorium to the Massachusetts Convention Center Authority for $34 
million. The City also raised about $50 million in overlay deficits for fiscal 1982. 
Funds in the Disproportionate Assessment Fund were to be used until June 30, 1983 for 
Tregor-related abatements. After that, disproportionate assessment refunds were to 
be paid from regular overlay reserves or from other available City services. A key 
provision in the Act was that on June 30, 1983 any surplus in the Disproportionate 
Assessment Fund in excess of certain interest would be disbursed to the City for 
application to any purposes. 
The issuance of the bortds were secured by pledged revenues. These included an 
excise tax on the transfer of certain hotel and motel rooms in the city, an excise on 
the recording deeds for real estate transfers, and an excise on conversion of new 
construction of condominiums and on subdivisions or consolidations of real property in 
the City. To the best of our knowledge this was the first authorization through Hbme 
Rule petition of a local excise tax in Massachusetts. In addition to the pledged 
revenue the DAF included the City's receipts from the 121A excise imposed on limited 
dividend developments in the City in lieu of property taxes. 
Passage of the Tregor bill had the dual effect of relieving the City of the burden 
of paying large amounts of commercial abatements from current revenues and 
reimbursing the City for previous tax refunds for such cases. 
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NevEfrtheless;, despite t.his finarycial. r~liefr tw.o.: of the City'~ four key financial 
indicators as:tually wo.rsened. On!y the overlay deficit ~nd appropriation deficit 
. • • 4 • 
,, 
. numbeq d~clined. , Accötding to . Table X,VI, the City incurred .r:ev~nue deficits during 
. • ;· I, , 
each year · beginning wi th 198? • .. Appropriation deficits, w.hile one-h~f of the_. a"'!oun~s 
e.xp~ri~nCEf't:earHe,r, were still $15-.16 milllon annually, an_d the overlay deficitwas,. by 
historical standards, practically nil. The ~nnual appropriation raised was in the range . . . ' . ~ . 
of $35 to $~5 million, histot;ically-high absolute totals. 
Particularly impor~a!)t to this analysis are the financial rnanagement reforms 
·· contajne<jl .in the Tregor Bill. These reforms included: 
· 1. An .· e~penditure ,allotment system to prevent department l'ersonnel 
overspending. 
Under its provisions, effective for fiscal 1984, each City department and agency, 
except the School Department, may not exceed in either the first or second quarter of 
each fiscal year 30 percent of the total appropriations for all personnet categories in 
that fiscal year and may not allot less than 21 percent of total appropriations in either 
the third or fourth fiscal quarter. 
For the School Department, not more than 20 percent of school personnet 
expenditures may be made in the first fiscal quarter and not more than 30 percent in 
. any of the remaining quarters. 
lt is the City Auditor's responsibility, in determining that a departmEmt will 
exhaust or has exhausted its quarterly allotment and any amounts allotted but 
unexpended in previous quarters, to notify the Mayor. The Mayor must within seven 
days either waive or enforce the allotment. 
. "if the allotment for such a quarter i~ waived or not ~nforced, th~ department 
heac( must reduce subsequent quarters' allotments appropriately. If the atiotment for 








































1981 - 1984 
(millions) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
Revenue Surplus 
(deficits) 5.5 (6.5) (20.8) ( 6. 7) 
Appropriation surplus 
(deficit) (36.9) (35.6) (16.2) (15.9) 
Prior year overlay 
(deficit) raised (22.7) (55.2) (5.2) ( 5. 6) 
Deficit appropriation 
raised (25.0) (31.5) (44.2) (36.7) 





















expenditures for the remainder of the quarter." (s.l8, C.l90, Acts of 1982) Personnel 
expenditures in excess of allotment is a violation of law subject to criminal sanctions. 
This provision was designed to reduce the Citys proclivities for appropriation deficits 
documented in this report. 
2. The Act empowered the Mayor to reallocate among departments a 
maximum of $3 million in non-personnet appropriations. The intent of this 
proposal was to provide some executi ve flexibili ty to allow for unforeseen 
ernergend es. 
3. The Act allowed the City Auditor, with the Mayor's approval after the 
close of the fiscal year, to make transfers from one . appropriation to 
another for the purpese only of closing the account. The time allowed for 
such transfers was reduced. 
4. The Act also mandated reforms concerning assessing policy. It required 
that on property for which the assessors granted abatements the lower 
assessments should be maintained unless there was evidence of a value 
increase or unless there was a general revaluation. ßoston's long assessing 
history provoked this reform. In the past, properties which received an 
abatement in one year were reassessed up to the disputed value in the 
subsequent year. 
While each of these were important reforms, subsequerft financial experience 
indicated that they did not eliminate every loophole. 
Fiscal 1984 
The final budget of the Whi te Administration (fiscal 1984) was balanced by using 
about $72 million in non-recurring revenue. The City of Boston averted a potential 
gap between revenues and expenditures during the 1984 fiscal year by use of the 
following list of non-recurring revenues for normal operating purposes: 
1. An unallocated balance of $19.6 million in the 1982 overlay deficit (tax 
refunds originally raised as amounts in excess of overlay reserves and 
subsequently charged to the Funding Loan authorized by the Legislature). 
2. The unexpended balance (as of June 30, 1983) of $34 million in the 
Disproportionate Assessment Fund, consisting of proceeds from the sale of 
the Hynes Veterans Auditorium and from Funding Loan bonds in excess of 
reimbursements to the City's General Fund for prior tax refunds of 
41 
disproportionate .assessment liabilities (for illegal valuations on commerci~l I 
properties). · 
3. Proceeds from the sale of surplus garage facilities owned by the City in 
excess of debt service paid and outstanding on such properties, estimated 
at $18.5 million. · 
The use of these one-time revenue sources was akin to selling the 11family jewels11 
in order to maintain a lifestyle that current income could not sustain. 
The 1984 tax rate computation was also balanced without providing for the 
anticipated full year's cost of collective bargaining salary and wage increases for City, 
County and School employees which were currently under negotiation and expected to 
require up to another $25 million in appropriations. 





next Mayor in preparing the fiscal 1985 budget. In addition to finding increased I 
revenues to meet increasing costs, it would also be necessary to replace the one-time, 
non-recurring revenues allocated in fiscal 1984. Failure to provide an adequate 
appropriation to cover collective bargaining costs was an historic practice used by the 
City to avoid tipping its collective bargaining hand. It also was the basis for 
appropriation deficits for many years. 
VII. THE EARL Y FL YNN YEARS: OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES? 
We have submitted a tight, balanced budget together with revenue estimates to 
provide a clear picture of the city's financial future. With strong management 
controls and support from the Commonwealth in our efforts to develop new 
revenue sources, we will be able to provide the residents of Boston with the 
services they need. (April 18, 1984) 
Wi.th these words, Mayor Raymond L. Flynn submitted his fiscal 1985 budget to 
































appropriations of Police and Fire Departments and also provided increased funding for 
Health and Hospitals and the Community Schools Program". Independent observers 
viewed the budget as out of balance, but the appropriation and tax orders were 
nevertheless enacted unanimously by the City Council. 
As originally submitted, the budget document included revenue estimates as well 
as appropriations. Among the revenue estimates were $10 million from anticipated 
legislative passage of a parking excise tax. Revenue and appropriations for the · 
subrni tted budget totalled $963 million. 
The City's final plan for fiscal 1985 (i.e. the tax recapitulation sheet approved by 
the State Department of Revenue) varied from the original submlssion of April 18 in 
two major respects: (1) the Mayor subsequently reduced the budget by $4.7 milllon, up 
to a 5 percent reduction from the appropriations of some 48 departments. (Exempt 
from this directive were the major line departments of Police, Fire, Hospitals, and 
Public Work~ and Parks and Recreation, which account for 68 percent of total 
departmental requirements) and (2) the 1984 fiscal year had ended with deficits which 
had tobe raised in 1985. An appropriation deficit of $15.6 million, a revenue deficit 
of $23.9 mllllon, and an overlay deficit of $13.9 million for a total deficit 
appropriation requirement of $.53.4 million for fiscal 1985. 
On the revenue side there were a number of changes from the original plan, two 
of which are significant. (1) the parking excise tax was not passed by the legislature. 
(2) as originally subrnitted, the 1985 budget was purported to be in balance without any 
resort to one-tirne non-recurring revenue sources as had been used to balance the past 
year's budget. As finally submitted to the State Department of Revenue, the 1985 tax 
rate recapitulation included - $54.1 million in one-time revenues -- $29.6 million from 
the sale of garages - $8.2 million frorn additional 121A state reimbursements, $4 
43 
million from parking meter fund balances, $2.7 million in street cut deposits, and $10.6 
million in carried forward appropriation balances, mainly from the School Department. 
In December 1984, the Boston Finance Commission issued a report which took 
issue, albeit rather meekly, with the City's spending plan for fiscal 1985. The 
Commission expressed concern that the " ••. city weakens its own position (for 
additional revenue) if its overall spending plan is based on unrealistic assumptions". lt 
also noted that "(t)he city faces yet another deficit this year because it submitted, and 
the state Department of Revenue approved, an unrealistic tax rate recap sheet 
(budget)". (emphasis added). The Commission concluded, upon review of expenditure 
and revenue plans, that " ..• the city cannot comply with that budget". 
The Commission stated: , 
It appears to us that despite several positive steps taken by the Flynn 
Administration that the revenue side of the ledger is unduly optimistic. When 
combined with several underfunded expenditures, another deficit will inevitably 
result. The City of Boston has ended each of the past nine years with a deficit 
almest always due to working with unrealistic overall budgets (p.2.)~ 
As this report is being written, the fiscal 1985 budget, which the Mayor called a 
"tight, balanced budget", the City Council passed unanimously, and the State 
Department of Revenue approved, is by admission of City officials about $30 million 
in defici t. 
This deficit projection could still change since the City can use unliquidated 
encumbrances of past years to reduce it. Nevertheless, as of this writing, the City's 
overall deficit for the current year is due to variances on both the appropriation and 
revenue sides. 
The appropriation defici t is estimated at $23 million. Three-fourths of this 
deficit is due to non-personnel spending in excess of appropriations -- higher than 



































year's estimate for the Court House Commission; and omission of employee health and 
insurance benefit provisions for the Health and Hospitals Department. In addition, 
salary increases for the Fire Department were overlooked. 
Approximately $6.4 million of the deficit is on the revenue side. The cause is 
mainly an over-optimistic estimate of revenues. (For details see the April 23, 1985 
report of the Boston Municipal Research Bureau.) 
Attention has now turned to the fiscal 1986 budget which, according to City 
spokesmen is in "structural deficit" to the amount of $58 milllon. The Research 
Bureau estimates the deficit as $51.7 million. T~e Mayor is actively seeking authority 
to raise $45 million in local option excise taxes. He originally proposed, among others, 
a parking excise tax ($12 million), an increased hotel/mdtel room tax ($15 million) and 
' - -
an entertainment tax ($18 million). 
Although legislative passage of these specific options lock bleak, the probability 
' of the City obtaining at least some additional financial aid is quite good. The most 
likely option is for the state to use part of lts 1985 surplus to pick up municipal costs 
for county corrections. However, as of this writing, it seems likely that the 
courthause buildings now owned by counties and rented by the state, might be 
purchased by the state or that a jet fuel tax and/or part of a hotel/motel tax increase 
might be shared with Boston. 
While it is extremely difficult to predict exactly what will happen, and in what 
amounts, it is very likely that Boston will receive in Calendar 1985 an additional 
source of funds to help i t deal wi th the gap between operating revenues and operating 
expenses for fiscal 1986. 
It is not our purpese to detail the size or specific causes of the operating gap. 
We leave the size of this year's revenue-expenditure gap to the expertise of the 
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Bureau. Our paramount questions are: What have we learned from Boston's earlier 
"fiscal crises" and "solutlons"? To what extent can they be helpful in structuring 
today's resolution? 
vm. FISCAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES - AN OVER VIEW 
Deficit Spending: A Way of Ufe 
Boston's history over the past three decades resembles a mosaic of fiscal crisis. 
The word '.'defici t" has been a distinguishing characteristic of the Ci ty's financial 
reports. Independent analyses of the City's condition have not only emphasized the 
fiscal imbalance as between Boston and its suburbs or between Boston and the State. 
They have also questioned whether the City's heavy service responsibilities and its 
constricted revenues are adequate explanations for Boston's high costs and high taxes. 
' We believe there is conslderable evidence to support the claim that .much of the 
City's financial difflculties are due to these imbalances. We also believe, however, 
that irrespecti ve of service/ cost and revenue maladjustments, the Ci ty's management 
bears reponsibillty for preparing and rigorously implementlng sound financia~ plans 
that balance appropriations with revenues. Our major conclusion from thls detailed 
review of the City's fiscal history is that public tolerance of persistent deficlts over 
such a long period of time is rooted in Boston's local political culture. 
The City of Boston has been spending beyend its means for most of the past 35 
years. With the intermittent exceptions of the first term of the Coltins Administation 
and the brief interval following major state bailouts, the bottom-line of the City's 
current account has been wri tten in indelible red ink. During the most recent period, 







































million and $40 million a year. The $40 million operating deficit in 1984 occurred 
despite the extraordinary resort to non-recurring revehues amounting to $76 million. 
An operating deficit estimate at $30 million for the current 1985 fiscal year will occur 
despite the utilization of $54 million in ,non-recurring revenues. 
Revenue Defici ts 
The gap between estimated and actual revenues and receipts has been the major 
factor in Boston's failure to live within its available resources. In fact the City 
incurred annual revenlie deficits in 19 of the fiscal-year periods between 1950 and 
1984. This incredible legacy of revenue deficits has persisted to the present despite 
the provisions incorpo,rch~d in the 1957 funding loan legisiatibn which were designed to 
··r j, 
avert and discourage the incidence of such deflcits. These safeguards required the 
State Director of Accounts to determine and certify the amount by whch estimated 
receipts exceeded actual receipts in the preceding fiscal year. They also required that 
estimated receipts be approved by the State Tax Commission (present Commissioner 
of Revenue) and be limited in amount to the aggregates of actual receipts collected 
during the preceding year from the same sources as certified annually by the City 
Auditor. Although the safeguards in the funding loan legislation have been 
subsequently strengthened, revenue deficits have become a fixture in the City's flscal 
profile. 
Appropriation Defici ts 
The propensity of City, County and School agencies to spend in excess of enacted 
appropriations from time to time has exacerbated Boston's revenue deficit syndrome. 
In the 10-year period between 1975 and 1984, appropriation deficits exceeded $240 
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million. The annual levels of over-expenditures ranged from a low of $15.6 million in 
1984 to a high of $43.4 million in 1980. With almest 10 months of the current fiscal 
year completed, the BMRB estimated that the appropriation deficit for 1985 would be 
about $23 million. Appropriation deficits have occurred because of . unforeseen 
contingencies and emergencies, budget estimation 1apses, deliberate understatment of 
appropriation needs and/or failures in internal control and auditing procedures. That 
they have become a way of life despite examination of the City's financial statements 
and recommendations for management improvements by independent auditors since 
1973, and despi te specific provisions in the funding loan legislation of 1982 to 
. ·, 
discourage over-spen'ding, reflects deep-seated weaknesses in Boston's fiscal 
management structure. 
Annual and cumulative deficits have also plagued certain of Boston's so-called 
enterprise operations -- its sewer system and the Health and Hospitals Department. 
Operating deficits in sewer services emerged in 1962 and reached a peak of $6 million 
a year in 1976 and 1977. Legislation of 1977 establishing a relatively independent and 
self-supporting Boston Water and Sewer Commission authorized refinancing of about 
$25 million in accumulated sewer and water service operating deficits and 
indebtedness, and ended the prior practice of levying deficits of these City utilities on 
Boston's property taxpayers. 
Serious defici ts in Health and Hospital Department operations became visible 
with the accounting change that established a Health and Hospital Enterprise Fund in 
1978. Since that time separate accounts for the Health and Hospitals Department 
show end-of-year differences between operating income and expenses, identify the 
lasses from services to patients and the subsidies required from the City's funds for 






































net losses. ßetween 1982 and 1984 the annual net loss from operations has ranged 
between $20 million and $29 millior1' per year. Operating transfers from City funds to 
the Health and Hospital Enterprise Fund have ranged between $12 million and $21.5 
million per year. By the end of the 1984 fiscal year, the ba1ance in this fund had 
accumulated to a deficit of $132.9 million. 
Overlay Deficits 
Frorn time lmmernorial ßoston's finances have been battered by the outflow of 
property taxes from the City treasury because of tax refunds stemming from 
successful appeals of non-residential property owners from established assessed 
valuation figures. At intervals in the Ci ty's history, property tax refunds in excess of 
available overlay reserves accumulated in amounts that threatened Boston's cash flow 
capacity to meet payrolls and other obligations. At these pointsintime (1950, 1957 
and 1982) the Legislature was asked to intervene by authorizing Boston to liquidate the 
accumulation of overlay deficits, not in the suceeding year as required by law, but 
over a period of years, usually through the issuance of funding bonds. 
Although earlier funding loan acts had sought to prevent any future incidence of 
accumulated overlay deficits by requiring more realistic overlay reserves, they had 
neither included safeguards to guarantee assessments at 100 percent of full and fair 
cash value as mandated by law, nor added provisions that were designed to force local 
assessors to recognize abated values in their subsequent assessment rolls, thereby 
restering confidence and reality to a.ssessment practices. Not until the property 
classification act of 1979, requiring general revaluation every three years and state 
oversight · of assessing practices, and the revaluation of all property in 1983 were 
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remedies adopted which were almed at the root causes of the Clty's perennlal problern 
of overlay deflclts -- lts assessments. 
Nevertheless and despite the lnvestment of over $13 million to plan and 
implement the comprehensive revaluation of property completed in 1983 and the $7 
million allocated to carry out the 1986 revaluation initiated thls year, there is still 
evidence indlcating that overlay deficits are continuing to have material adverse 
effects on Boston's financial operations. Although the prior administration had set 
aside addi tlonal reserves to cover !arge anticipated refunds from settlement of 
abatement appeals on the electric and gas companies, overlay defici ts re-emerged only 
a year after implementation of the funding loan legislation. The 1984 tax rate 
requirements included $5.6 million for overlay deficits; the succeeding year's tax rate 
. increased the overlay deficlt to $14 million. 
The recent report by independent auditors on the City's financial statements for 
the 1984 fiscal year contains ominous language concerning the amount of the City's. 
contingent liabili ty on "numerous pending property tax abatement applications", 
language that is similar in tone to the warnings in prior audit reports covering the 1980 
and 1981 fiscal years. "We are unab1e to satisfy ourselves," noted the Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell report, "as to the adequacy of the City's $109.3 million liability for estimated 
tax refunds and the classification of the liability between the $53.2 million recorded in 
the General Fund and the $56.1 million recorded in the General Long-Term Obligations 
Account Group. The liability recorded in the General Fund anticipates that the tax 
refunds will occur during the 1984 fiscal year, the remaining liabili ty to occur in 
subsequent fiscal years. 
According to the City's Commissioner of Assessing, the auditor's comments are 







































companies. Boston Edison alone has appeals for abatements pending from 1977 to 
1985; appeals by Boston Gas cover 1983 through 1985 tax years. The worst case 
estimate of total abatements to these utilities for these years is in the $100 million 
range. The City has established reserves of $23.6 million against this contingency and 
anticipates setting aside additional reserves of $5 million for 1986. 
While we believe that the 1983 revaluation, despite its problems, ended the 
City's overlay deficit cycle, there is no doubt that if these two ut ilities are successful 
in their abatement appeals, another round of bond issue financing of overlay deficits 
would be necessary. 
Fiscal Planning and Management Structure 
The periodic eruption of fiscal crises over the past three decades suggest an 
internal tolerance among Boston's fiscal planners and managers for chronic deficits, 
expedient fiscal policies and counterproducti ve assessmeot practices. The 
Administrative Services Board, with a legal mandate to coordinate the City's financia1 
processes, and the Administrative Services Department, with centralized powers over 
essential budget, personnel and purchasing functions since January 1, 1954 have not 
lived up to original expectations. The scope of responsibility of the Administrative 
Services Department has been diluted by gradual dispersion and fragmentation of i ts 
powers and by the erstwhile creation of replicati ve agencies in budget and mangement, 
fiscal affairs and policy management, decisions made in 1978, 1980 and 1982 that 
reflected deep doubts on the competence and reliability of the Administrative Services 
Department. Although total staff in the administrative, budget and personnel divisions 
of the Administrative Services Department has quadrupled over a quarter-century, its 
professional reputation has been tarnished by periodic poli ticization, staff turnever, 
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bureaucratic competition and weak leadership. As for the Administrative Services 
Board, it has been an ineffective coordinating device, more of an odd-jobs agency with 
a narrow mission and limi ted role. 
A 1979 independent audit of the City's finances, pointing to serious deficiencies 
in the assessment of property, in personnet and payroll controls, in purchasing and 
contract practices, in funding of retirement benefits, in management information 
systems, in departmental revenue systems, in internal auditing, in internal accounting 
and in personnel policies and practices, represented a serious indictment not only of 
the Administrative Services Department and its constituent budget, personnel, 
purchasing, and data processing units, but of the consolidated Collecting-Treasury 
Department, the Civil Service-headed Auditing Department and the Assessing 
Department. Similarly, the 658-page report Boston In Transition: A Financial 
Analysis, issued early in 1984 by a financial and research team on behalf of the newly-
elected Mayor, provided substantial documentation of weaknesses in Boston's financial 
planning and management insti tutions and systems. Except for establishing a new uni t 
in the Mayor's Office to oversee capital planning and budgeting (a function assigned by 
law to the Public Facilities Department), however, efforts to strengthen the City's 
financial planning and management practices have to date avoided fundamental 
reorganization of existing intitutional arrangements. 
During the campaign debates of 1983, Mayor Flynn had proposed appointment of 
a chief financial officer, ei ther through the grant of additional powers to a current 
position or by creating a new office. In addition, presumably critical of the 
expenditure control role of the Auditing Department and convinced that provisions of 
the 1982 funding loan legislation did not go far enough, Mayor Flynn had also 








































proposals have been implemented. Moreover, it remains tobe seen whether the five-
member Audit Committee, established under the 1982 funding loan act, will help 
generate significant improvements in Boston's fiscal policies and management 
practices. The Committee is responsible for monitaring the progress of mandated 
annual audits undertaken by independent, certified public accountants (CPAs) by 
meeting at least quarterly with the accounting firm and for submitting 
recommendtions to the Mayor and City Council after reviewing audit report 
recommendations; but the Committee has not yet carried out the latter phase of its 
statutory assignment. The management letter issued by the CPAs to supplement their 
recently completed audit is still being reviewed by City offleials and has not yet been 
transmitted to the Audit Committee. Finally, the issue should be raised whether 
independent audit monitaring should be jointly accountable to the Mayor and City 
Council or to the City Council alone. As the elective body that appropriates funds and 
authorizes loans, it is the City Couocil that should be responsible for oversight of the 
independent audit function and for follow-up of Audit Committee recommmendations. 
If City offleials do not reverse historic and recent patterns of fiscal behavior, of 
which the following examples are only illustrative, they will experience great 
difficulty in operating within the predictable limits on available resources, however: 
1. The tendency to negotiate collecti ve bargaining agreements where 
the financial impact is considerably greater in the out-years of such 
contracts, the tendency to omit budgeting for full yearly 
requirements of anticipated collective bargaining agreements, and 
the tendency to operate for relatively long periods without collective 
bargaining agreements. 
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2. The tendency to ignore or overlook the operating budget irnplications 
of new capital facilities, expanded capital facilities and renovated 
capi tal facili ti es. 
3. The tendency to provide inadequate appropriations in the operating 
budget for maintenance, thereby jeopardizing capital investments in 
faciities and subsequently necessitating large and continuing bond 
issues for deferred maintenance repairs. (footnote). 
Major Chan-ges in State-Local Services/Cost Mix 
Over the past two decades a new pattern of fiscal interdependence as between 
state and municipai governments in Massachusetts has emerged. A significant 
component of this trend, which has had important implications for Boston's own 
finances, is the changing mix in the allocation of responsibilities as between the state 
and its cittes and towns. The gradual but steady increase in state assumption and/or 
financing of local services since 1966 has shifted the financing of a growing list of 
costs from property taxes to broad-based, more elastic state taxes. A corollary of this 
trend is greater state encourgement and legislative incenti ves for municipali ties to 
cover the costs of enterprise operations, utility-like systems such as water and sewer 
and cemeteries and waste disposal, and services with clear-cut beneficiaries such as 
hospitals that can be financed through charges, fees, third-party payments and revenue 
bond authorizations, mechanisms that will render them self-supporting and remove 
them from property tax pressures. 
Major changes in the State-ßoston services/ cost mix, including the years of 
effective transfer or cost assumption and the estimte of financial relief to the City of 









































TRANSFER/SHIFT OF J'v!tTNICIPAL SERVICES/COSTS TO 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Effective Fiscal Years of Estirnated llnnual Financial 
Service/Cast Servic:;e/Cost Shifts Relief to Boston 
Public Welfare 
50/50 Sharing of ~BTA Deficit 
Boston Water and Sewer Commission 
County Courts 
County Medical Examiner Services 
Medicaid Payments for OUtpatient 
Services and Medicare/Medicaid 
Reirnbrusernents for Portion of 
Cast of Free Care to Patients 
(Under state's hospital cost 
control law--c.372, Acts of 
1982) 
Hospital care for General Relief 
welfare recipients 
(Under "free care" provisions 
of c. 372) 
Health services (in addition to 
hospital care) for General 
Relief welfare recipients 
MDC Parks Assessrnent 





1978 - 1980 
1982 





*Net cost excluding expenditures frorn federal and state funds. 
**Accurnulated deficits and debt service. 











****Since assessrnent is deducted frorn estirnated distribution of local aid, 




















Although the shlfts of certain municipal costs to the Commonwealth has 
succeeded in rectifying some of the most glaring imbalances in the state-local 
services/ cost structure of Massachusetts, there is a significant residue of state 
assessments, municipal costs and fixed charges that {1) either entail large-scale 
subsidy from limited sources of local taxes and/or fees-for-service, or (2) defy 
political and economic rationality as continuing municipal responsibilities or State-
imposed mandates. 
Major Changes in State-Local Revenue Mix 
Even more significant than the shifting nature of the State-municipal 
services/ cost stucture has been the changing pattern of the state-municipal revenue 
structure in Massachusetts. Respanding to the pleas of municipal officials to 
amelierate the effects of property tax limitation under Proposition 2Yz, the State 
Legislature has not only authorized the selective transfer of municipal services and/or 
costs to the Commonwealth but has significantly increased the annual allocations of 
local aid and redirected i ts distribution among ci tles and towns according to more 
realistic measures of differences in local public service costs and local revenue-raising 
capaci ti es. 
The results have been dramatic. The State's proportion of state-local taxes has 
climbed from less than 50 percent of the total prior .to 1976 to about 66 percent of the 
total in 1985. Since 1983 the state tax proportion of state- local taxes in Masachusetts 
has exceeded the national average. 
For Boston, property tax limi tation, tax base expansion because of an 
unprecedented rate and scale of new constructlon, lncreased local aid based on 
formulas wlth greater sensltivity to needs and resources, enhancement of receipts 
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from fees, fines and service charges through self-help efforts and the utilization of a 
variety of non-recurring receipts have contributed to a major re-shaping of the 
revenue mix in the City's General Fund, as indicated in the accompanying comparative 
summary of taxrate revenues for 1950 and 1985. (Table XVIII.) Data for 1985 indicate 
that Boston's resource structure is being transformed into a revenue pie with almest 
equal one-third slices coming from property taxes, state aid and other locally-derived 
revenues. The relative decline in property tax prominence from 76 percent of the 
total in 1950 to 36 percent of the total in 1985 has been matched by incredibly sharp 
increases in local aid and miscellaneous sources of local revenues and receipts, which 
taken tagether now account for over 64 percent of the City's total resources. 
A major element of concern, however, is the heavy dependence of Boston on non-
recurring revenues for operating purposes, particularly from the sales of surplus City 
properties, a practice that the State's General Laws deny to other eitles and towns in 
the Commonwealth. 
Another continuing revenue problern is the annual gap of 20-25 percent between 
operating income and expenses of the Health and Hospitals Department, a revenue 
imbalance requiring not only recurring City subsidies for community health services, 
special health programs and infrastructure, but annual transfers from City funds to 
offset operating losses of the City's three medical institutions. Although recent 
legislation and regulations have liberalized reimbursements under Medicaid for 
outpatient services and under Medicare for portians of the cost of providing free 
patient care, City subsidies from property taxes remain high because there is an 
unusually large concentration of low-income residents in Boston without third-party 
coverage or financial resources to pay for in-patlent and other health service needs, 









































ESTIMATED REVENUES ~~D RECEIPTS, CITY OF BOSTON, 
1950 AND 1985 
Adjusted Tax Levy Estimates 
1950 1985 
Arnount $ % of Total Arnount 
(millions) (millions) 
Property Tax es $98.8 75.8% $363.2 
State Aid 
Other Local 
12.3 9.4% 337.1 
Receipts 19.2 14.8% 304.6 
Total 130.3 100.0% 1004.9 
Sources: State Oepartment of Revenue, Tax Rate 
Recapitulation for Boston, 1985 Fiscal Year; 
City of Boston, Auditing Department 
Annual Report, 1950 . 
























Relief. In fact the Boston City Hospital provides one-quarter of all the free care in 
Massachusetts at an annual estimated cost of $50 million. 
Reimbursements to the City Hospital for free care through the end of the 1984 
fiscal year totalled $23 million and another $12 million in reimbursement claims have 
been submitted, but the financial Statements of the Health and Hospital Enterprise 
Fund do not reflect this revenue because of the uncertainty over the total amount to 
be received. Thus, the $23 million in actual third-party reimursements for free care 
has been used to reduce at least temporarily the required subsidy from the City's 
General Fund, awaiting final determination as to free care reimbursement amounts. 
On the other. hand, financial Statements of the Health and Hospital Enterprise Fund 
include a liability of $15.5 million to cover alleged overpayments of Medicaid out-
patient revenue totalling $25.7 million for the years 1982-84. The latter amount has 
also been tentatively applied in reduction of the City's subsidy. Under a worst case 
scenario, the Health and Hospital Enterprise Fund could suffer a net loss of $33 million 
in revenue because of these controversies, thereby further exacerbating its 
accumulated deficit condition of $133 million at the close of the 1984 fiscal year. 
Closely related to this concern over the recurring and accumulated deficit in the 
Health and Hospital Enterprise Fund is the threat that effective October 1, 1985 the 
federal government may lift or modify the walver granted to Massachusetts and 
several other states from compliance with the national policy for Containment of 
health care cost increases. If this walver is not extended, offleials of the Health and 
Hospitals Department estimate an aggregate reduction of up to $52 million in third-
party reim bursements in the 1986 and 1987 fiscal years. Since non-public hospi tals as 
a group would benefit financially from the federal reimbursement system alternative, 
they favor discontinuance of the waiver. 
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Finally, despite the overall improvement in the adequacy of local aid and in the 
equi ty of i ts distribution, there are lingering issues of predictabili ty and fairness --
in the annual uncertainty over how much local aid will be appropriated, in the 
Commonwealth's current 60/40 formula for sharing State tax growth with cities and 
towns and in the State's disposition to finance municipal and/or county costs and 
assessments shifted to the State from local aid distributions due to cities and towns. 
IX. RECOMMENDA TIONS 
The following !ist of recommendations is divided into four categories: (l) 
recommendations to correct state-local imbalances in service responsibilities and 
costs; (2) recommendations to reduce Boston's revenue imbalances; (3) 
recommendations to · strengthen Boston's fiscal management structure, and (4) 
recommendations to eliminate glaring weaknesses in flscal policies and practices. 
It should be emphasized that some of the recommendations are directed toward 
easing Boston's more immediate and shorter-term flnancial difficulties and they 
include bills winding their way through the Legislature. Other proposals, however, 
particularly those targeted at elimination or reduction of cost imbalances through 
transfer of selected service responsibilities to the Commonwealth and · measures to 
increase the City's available resources, would require a langer period of discussion and 
implementation because they are more controversial. This latter group of 
recommendations includes statewide changes which would cost relatively !arge 
amounts of money and would have to be phased in over a period as with state 







































Eliminate or Reduce Boston's Service/Cost lmbalances 
1. Shift the net costs for the following !ist of human services still financed by 
cities and towns from property taxes to the Commonwealth: 
a. The costs of correctional services for the Suffolk County Jail arid 
House of Correction incurred by the City of Boston and assessments 
for County correctional services imposed on other cities and towns. 
b. The municipal cost of personal health care, local public health 
acti vi ties and environmental heal th services in excess of third-party 
reimbursements, service fees and charges, grants from governmental 
and private agencies and receipts from all sources for such services 
other than property taxes. 
c. The municipal share of costs for state-mandated financial assistance, 
medical benefits and social services to eligble veterans and their 
dependents. 
2. Replace the property tax as the funding mechanism for municipal shares of 
MBTA deficits; or credit cities and towns for 50 percent of the annual 
allocation of federal assistance to Massachusetts for mass transit 
Operations to Massachusetts prior to determining the state-municipal 
shares of the MB TA defici t, thereby reducing their M BT A assessments; or 
adopt a new formula for allocating municipal proportians of the MBTA 
deficit that is more accurate as to the city and town residence of transit 
system riders boarding transit vehicles within the city of Boston. 
3. Shift the ownership and operation of county courthouses to the 
Commonwealth thereby completing State takeover of the county court 
function initiated in 1978. 
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4. Eliminate the residue of state assessments still imposed on cities and towns 
on the basis of outmoded concepts and arrangements for charging the 
direct costs of certain state-provided services to a city or town and/or 
assessing cities and .towns for their pro-rata shares of particular regional 
services special education, state supervisio'n of retirement systems, 
audit of municipal accounts, motor vehide excess tax bills, mosquito 
control districts,. air pollution control districts, and county cooperative 
extension services, but excluding health insurance for elderly governmental 
retirees and the shared costs of metropolitan planning councils. 
5. Shift the annual increases in costs of municipal contributory pensions not 
reimbursed by the state and that are in excess of 2Y2 percent over the prior 
year's cost to the Commonwealth. · 
Below is a summary of the estimated fiscal impacts from the elimination or 
reduction in net operating costs of the City of Boston and of the estimated cost to the 









































Fiscal Impacts of Proposed Service/Cast Shifts 
County jails and houses of correction 
Municipal health services 
Veterans'benefi ts 
Regional transi t def ici ts: 
Replacement of property tax 
Municipal s~aring of federal 
assistance for transit operations 
Revision of assessment formula 
County courthouses 
Miscellaneous state assessments 
Annual increases in municipal 
costs of contributory pensions 
that exceed 2Y2% over prior year. 











* Based on 1986 budgets and tax rate estimates. 












*** Since state rental of county court facillties roughly cover operating expenses of 
such facilities, Suffalk County and other counties would be spared the 
extraordinary capital costs for future renovations and/or replacements. 
**** Only for first year after effective date of shift. 
Enhance Boston's Revenue Sources 
1. Increase the proportion of state tax growth dedicated to the local aid fund 
from ltO percent to 50 percent since total local expenditures currently 
constitute 52 percent of total state-local costs. (The current allocation of 
ltO percent dates from 1978 when the local aid fund was established and the 
rough calculation was made that liberalized school aid and state absorption 
of county court costs could be f inanced by a set-aside in such fund equal to 
40 percent of annual increases in income, sales and corporation taxes.) 
Incidentally, it is estimated that the increase in local expenditures in the 





Terminate the State's current policy of financing the shifts of municipal 
costs and/or assessments to the Commonwealth by equivalent deductions 
from local aid distributions, thereby providihg fiscal relief to cities and 
towns that is restricted to future cost increases in shifted costs, as 
I 
illustrated by the 1985 decision governing assessments on ci ties and towns 
for the MDC parks system and for other state-owned parks and recreation 
facilities. Otherwise there will continue to be confusion over jurisdictional 
and financial responsibility as between the Commonwealth and its eitles 
and towns over such responsibili ties and costs. 
Substitute per capita income for per capita equalized valuations of 
property as the measure of municipal revenue-raising capacity in the 
formula governing distribution of local aid from lottery, beano and charity 
game receipts. Statutory limits on property tax levies and data 
deficiencies in determining equalized valuatlons of non-residential 
properties have largely invalidated the relevance of equalized valuations 
for measuring the capacity of eitles and towns to raise revenues. 
4. Shift the net cost to cities and towns of so-called clause abatements, 
property tax exemptions to persans defined by state law as unable to bear 
their normal shares of public expenqitures (persons with lirnited resources 
or physical disabilities and the elderly) and to groups of veterans (including 
their wives, widows or parents) as rewards for wartime service to the 
Commonwealth. (The state now reimburses eitles and towns for under $15 
million a year, equi valent to only about 38 percent of the $40 million cost 
of such clause abatements.) Full state reimbursement for abatement of 






































deduction of one-half of rents from earned income under the state lncome 
tax to a maxlmum of $2500 per year. (Thls latter state subsldy is 
estimated at $57 million a year.) 
5. Offset local tax base erosion in Boston and other ci ties and towns by 
lnstituting a fairer system of state reimbursement for property taxes 
currently lost on state ownership of land for institutional purposes by 
updating in lieu tax payments on state-owned and authorlty-owned 
buildings, by extending state reimbursement to all tax-exempt land and 
buildlngs owned by the Commonwealth (not covered by in lieu payments) 
and by providing state reimbursement of eitles and towns for property tax 
exemptions enjoyed by non-profit, non-governmental Institutions similar to 
the policy adopted by the state of Connecticut. 
6. Authorize eitles and towns to levy selective local option taxes that would 
not impact adversely on local economies, particularly excise taxes on 
economic activities with clearly indentifiable beneficiaries of such taxed 
services. {This extends the legislative precedent for limlted local excises 
dedicated to payment of debt service under ßoston's Funding Loan Act of 
1982.) 
Table XIX summarizes estimated revenue benefits to the City of Boston and of 
the estimated impact on all cities and towns of these proposed changes in the 
state/municipal revenue mix. 
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TABLE XX 
Impact of Proposals for Revenue Enhancement 
City of Boston 
Fifty percent sharing of state tax growth 
Revised formula for lottery aid 
distribution 
State reimbursements for net costs 
of clause abatements 
State reimbursement for tax-exempt 
property 
Selective local option taxes: 
Increased hotel/ motel excise tax 
A viation fuel excise tax 







10.0 -- 15.00 
Estimate dependent on municipal decisions to levy tax. 








1. To improve fiscal planning and management and concentrate political and 
bureaucratic accountability for fiscal policies, establish a new position of 
chief financial officer or amend provisions of the ordinance affecting the 
position of Director of Administrative Services to provide its incumbent 
with the powers and duties of a chief financial officer. This proposal is in 
support of an earlier recommendation made by the Boston Municipal 
Research Bureau. 
2. To tighten controls over spending practices and to curb illegal and/ or 
wasteful practices before they become endemic, establlsh an internal audit 
unit as an internal check on programs and operations. 
3. To terrninate once and for all the legacy of revenue deficits, establish a 
revenue advisory board to provide advice and counsel to the C ollector-




































receipts, a mechanism similar to the one serving the Commonwealth of 
M assachusetts. 
4. Amend provisions of the Funding Loan Act (through a Horne Rule petition) 
so that the Audit Committee is appointed by and accountable to the City 
Council for audit report implementation and follow-up. 
Tighten and Modernize Boston's Fiscal Policies and Practices 
1. To end departmental overspending of appropriations require the Mayor to 
enforce or waive allotments of appropriations for personnel categories on a 
quarterly basis, not on an annual basis as currently practiced. Enforce 
those provisions making officials, who intentionally spend in excess of legal 
appropriations or involve the City in contracts the payments for which they 
are in excess of such appropriations personally liable for such overspending. 
2. T o curb the use of transfers after the close of the :tiscal year as defici t 
bailouts rather than as legitmate transactions to close the City's accounts, 
require the Mayor to provide written documentation and explanation to the 
City Clerk not later than 70 days after the close of the fiscal year of each 
transfer made by the City Auditor after June 30th, as recommended by the 
Boston Municipal Research Bureau (Special Report, 4/23/85). 
3. To cover unforeseen and extraordinary expenditures, including expenditures 
for extreme emergencies involving public health and safety and court 
judgements against the City, appropriate to an annual reserve fund an 
amount equivalent to a maximum of 3 percent of the property tax levy, 
expenditures from which would require appropriation transfers by the City 
Council upon recommendation of the Mayor, thereby subjecting Boston to 
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the same provisions of general law applicable to all cities (c. 40, G.L., s. 
5A). In effect such a reserve fund would replace the reserves of 4 percent 
of departmental appropriations for personnet established by executive 
order for the current fisca1 year. 
If the City incurs an operating deficit after a reserve mechanism is established, 
to the extent that the reserve is be1ow the statutory maximum, it should be increased 
as required in the next fisca1 year. If the entire reserve is not needed, the balance can 
be used for appropriation or tax rate reduction in the next fiscal year. This proposa1 is 
similar to a recommendation of the Boston Municipal Research Bureau. (Special 
Report, 4/23/85) 
4. To guard against Schoo1 Department overspending and to insure realistic 
annual schoo1 budgets, eliminate (by Horne Rule petition) the School 
Committee's statutory grants of appropriation power for generat schoo1 
purposes and alteration and repair of schoo1 buildings under a special act of 
1936 and place the Boston Schoo1 Committee on the same legal basis as 
other school committees in the Commonwealth with respect to those 
provisions of Proposition 2~ (c. 580, Acts of 1980) that ended the fisca1 
autonomy of school committees other than in Boston by eliminating judicia1 
enforcement of form er schoo1 fisca1 autonomy (amendment of c. 71, G.L., 
s. 7). 
5. To terminate the self-defeating practice of using the net proceeds from 
the sale of surplus City property for operating budget purposes, amend 
those provisions of the Boston Funding Loan Act of 1982 (by Horne Rule 
petition) that authorize such fiscal policy and make the City subject to 









































proceeds only for outstanding debt incurred for acquiring such property 
and/or for purposes for which cities and towns may issue bonds for periods 
of 5 years or more (c. 44, G.L., s. 63). 
To ensure that a comprehensive municipal budget is prepared that covers 
all funds to be expended during the forthcoming fiscal year, include in the 
annual budget presentations (City/County and School) estimated 
expenditures from all sources -- federal grants, state reimbursements and 
grants not subject to appropriation and private funds--in addition to those 
incorporated in the tax rate recapitulation requiring certification by the 
Sta~e Department of Revenue. 
In light of the historical tendency to underestimate tax levy requirements 
for court judgements and claims by !arge amounts, the City's Corporation 
Counsel should not only certify to the Board of Assessors a !ist of fiscal 
court judgements that must be raised but include a !ist of pending suits 
that are likely to result in final judgements against the City, including 
estimates of such contingent liabilities during the forthcoming fiscal year. 
This is similar to the recommendation of the Boston Municipal Research 
Bureau (Special Report, 4/23/85) that the City raise for court claims and 
judgements an amount equal at least to prior year's actual expenditures. 
In view of the poor past record in estimating tax levy requirements for 
employee health and life insurance benefits, the City's Director of 
Administrative Services should certify to the Board of Assessors and 
provide adequate documentation supporting estimate payments during the 
forthcoming fiscal year. This is also similar to the recommendation of the 
Boston Municipal Research Bureau that the appropriation for this purpose 
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be at least equal to the prior y.ear's expenditure and that the Director of 
Administrative Services certify that adequate funds covering fringe 
benefits in collective bargaining agreements have been included in the 
operating budget. Moreover, since the City's share of health insurance 
costs has been rising at an annual rate of 15 percent since 1982, responsible 
officials must intensify efforts to control this fixed expense by designing a 
comprehensive cost Containment strategy that encourages selection of 
cost-effective health care coverage and controls unnecessary utilization of 
heal th care services. 
i 
9. Since a large proportion of Boston's current and future overlay deficits is 
attributable to tax abatements on real and personal property of public 
utilities and since perennial Iitigation over the market value of public 
utility property is a statewide issue due to differences over standards of 
value, transfer the legal responsibility for assessment of public utility 
properties throughout the state to the State Department of Revenue and 
distribute the property taxes levied on such properties back to the city or 














































G.L. C59, ss. 38. "Fair Cash Value" means the price at which a property would be 
soid on the o:pen market in an arms length transaction between a wiUlng buyer 
and seller, netther of whom is under a compulsion to buy or sell. 
Since 1900, a total "taxable property va1ues" for the City o.f Boston remained 







Taxabie Values Tax Rateper $1000 











Since the property tax ls levled at a set rate per thousand dol1ar.s of assessed 
value, the hlgher the assessement ratio (the percentage of market value ai whlch 
the property is assessed) the greater the relative burden for a ,particular type of 
property. 
In a 1976 report describing assessment patterns in the City of Boston, 
assessments of various classes of real and personal property were .shown at an 
average percentage of full cash value ranging f.rom 26.8% to lOO%. See Tr.egor 
v. Board of Assessors, Mass., 287 NE 2nd 538, 540 (1979). · 
See Subur v. Commissioner of Cor orations and Taxation, 366 Mass 55, 321 NE 
2nd 641, 645 1974, recognitlon that discrimination between and within the 
various classes of property had long been the rule rather than the exception. 
Percentages of fair cash value for single family resldentlal property in various 
wards of the City of Boston ranged from 17% for Wards 1 and 2 to 79.2% and 
above in Ward 12 in 1975. See Tregor v. Board of Assessors, M~ss4 387 NE 2nd 
538, 540 (1979). 
Sudbur v. Commissioner of Cor orations and Taxation, 366 Mass 588, 321 NE 
2nd 614 The court found that the combination of high degree.s of 
dispersion and fractional valuation in some eitles resulted in discrirnination in 
the distribution of . state funds against eitles and towns "whose assessors act 
lawfully" •. 321 NE 2nd 647. 
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7 
8 "E~timating the . Ir:npact · of 100% Valliation and Taxation by Classification", 
Raymond · G. Torto .(Massachusetts Mayors Association) June 1978; "The 
Statewide Impact of .Full Property Revaluation in Massachusetts", William C. 
Wheaton (Federal Reserve Bank) May 1975. 
9 Massachusetts, 387 NE 2nd 538 (1979). 
10 Massachusetts, 387 NE 2nd 538, 544 ·0979). 
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